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ABSTRACT
ON THE TEMPTATION OF JESUS
SEPTEMBER 1993
THOMAS P. SULLIVAN, B.A., AMHERST COLLEGE
M.DIV., PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Gareth B. Matthews
It seems that the teachings of orthodox Christian
doctrine may actually suggest that Jesus' life does not
provide a useful moral example for the rest of us. The
traditional doctrine of the Incarnation states that Jesus
was fully human and fully God. The Bible says that Jesus was
"tempted in every way that we are, yet without sin." But
someone who is "fully God" cannot possibly sin, since one of
God's attributes is necessary moral perfection. And yet to
say that someone was tempted to sin seems to imply, in a
commonsensical way, that it was possible for that person to
sin. I call this the "Temptation Problem".
A number of philosophers and theologians have
considered this problem or problems very much like it. I
consider the proposed solutions to this apparent difficulty
of Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, R.L. Sturch, and Thomas V.
Morris. Each of their solutions fails, I argue, although
each of them presents an interesting way of dealing with the
seemingly incompatible human and divine attributes of Jesus.
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CHAPTER 1
THE TEMPTATION PROBLEM
So there [Jesus] stood, a red rose in his hand,
gazing at the village girls as they danced under a
newly foliaged poplar. And while he looked and
weighed one against the other - he wanted them all, butdid not have the courage to choose - suddenly he heard
cackling laughter behind him: a cool fountain rising
from the bowels of the earth. He turned. Descending
upon him with her red sandals, unplaited hair and
complete armor of ankle bands, bracelets and earrings
was Magdalene, the only daughter of his uncle the
rabbi. The young man's mind shook violently. "It's her
I want, her I want!" he cried, and he held out his hand
to give her the rose. But as he did so, ten claws
nailed themselves into his head and two frenzied wings
beat above him, tightly covering his temples. He
shrieked and fell down on his face, frothing at the
mouth. His unfortunate mother, writhing with shame, had
to throw her kerchief over his head, lift him up in her
arms and depart.
- Nikos Kazantzakis, The Last Temptation of Christ
Throughout the history of Christianity Jesus has been
presented as a model or moral example for humanity in its
struggle with sin and temptation. But it seems that orthodox
Christian doctrine actually teaches us that Jesus' life and
example are not relevant to our human moral concerns. The
traditional doctrine of the Incarnation says, roughly, that
Jesus had two natures - divine and human - in one person.
Through his human nature he was "like us in every respect"
[Hebrews 2:14, 17], while maintaining the attributes of the
divine nature.^ Each of the Synoptic Gospels contains the
1. All Biblical quotations and references are from the
Revised Standard Version.
2Story of Jesus' temptation in the wilderness. 2 More to our
point, the author of Hebrews explains why it was important
that Jesus was tempted at all:
Therefore he had to be made like his brethren in every
respect, so that he might become a merciful and
faithful high priest in the service of God, to make
expiation for the sins of the people. For because he
himself has suffered and been tempted, he is able to
help those who are tempted ... For we have not a high
priest who is unable to sympathize with our weaknesses,
but one who in every respect has been tempted as we
are, yet without sin.^
He was tempted, just as we are, but he steadfastly
resisted succumbing to any temptation. But therein lies the
problem. To say that someone is tempted to sin seems to
imply, in a sort of commonsensical way, that it is possible
for that person to sin. But Jesus' divine nature has as one
of its attributes necessary moral goodness: there is no
possible world where Jesus performs a morally wrong action.
So it was actually not possible for Jesus to sin. But if
this is so, the claim that Jesus somehow resisted temptation
loses a great deal of force. If Jesus could not sin anyway,
then the Pauline injunction to "be imitators of Christ" and
to resist temptation ourselves seems to be nothing more than
the Biblical equivalent of "just say no". We can refer to
this difficulty - that the doctrine of the Incarnation seems
to imply that Jesus could be tempted but could not sin - as
the "Temptation Problem". As we will see later in this
chapter, the earliest Christian writers seemed unaware of
2. See Matthew 4:1-11, Mark 1:9-11, and Luke 3:21-22.
3. Hebrews 2:17-18, 4:15.
3(or uninterested in) this problem. But as early as Augustine
attempts to explain the problem away result in some strains
within the orthodox tradition. And the attempts of important
later writers, such as Aquinas and Anselm, to explain the
apparent contradiction between the claim that Christ could
sin and the claim that Christ could not sin lend credence to
my assertion that the Temptation Problem is, in fact, a
problem for traditional orthodoxy.
The passage quoted above, from Kazantzakis ' s The Last
Temptation of C_hr ist
,
portrays graphically what might happen
to the human Jesus were he to approach temptation. In
Kazantzakis ' s view, apparently, the force of the necessary
goodness of Jesus' divine nature is every bit as powerful
and gripping as the force of ten large bird claws grabbing
one's head. In this story, Jesus seems to be prevented from
succumbing to the temptation of Mary Magdalene by divine
intervention - apparently, in this case, his own divine
nature
.
But Kazantzakis ' s story is disturbing in its portrayal
of Jesus as a poor role model in the face of temptation.
Jesus is presented with the spectacle of Mary, and he
immediately chooses her over the other village girls for his
wife. Her appearance, however, is that of a prostitute, and
the passage implies that she is somehow not really a proper
candidate for one's spouse. But Jesus does not resist her
allure by some force of character or holy will. He is
prevented, almost as if by a force outside himself, from
4approaching her by the sensation of large, powerful claws
gripping his head so that he writhes in pain and forgets
Mary altogether. It is important to note that Kazantzakis
'
s
Jesus, although he does not succumb to the temptation,
clearly is influenced by Mary Magdalene's appearance to the
point of desiring her (at least for his wife)
. Something
attracts him, but he is prevented from pursuing it by the
claws gripping his head. This Jesus seems to be genuinely
tempted, even though he is prevented from committing the sin
which is implied in the description of Mary and his
attraction to her. But Kazantzakis ' s picture of Jesus as a
lustful young man who guickly lunges at the prostitute Mary,
only to be prevented from going to her by the sensation of
claws and wings around his head, is hardly an attractive or
even workable role model for the rest of us when we are
tempted. If the only thing that prevents Jesus from
succumbing to temptation is his divine nature, manifested in
the claws, then the rest of us are in for some rough going
when we are faced with temptations.
Several thinkers in the Christian tradition have
tackled this problem; some head-on, some obliquely. Two
routes of defense seem open. One way to solve the Temptation
Problem is to show that it is not a logical contradiction to
claim that it was both possible and impossible that Jesus
commit a sin. This, in turn, allows one to claim that, since
it was possible for Jesus to sin, then he could be tempted
"in every way that we are". Another way to solve the problem
5is to show that even if one cannot sin in any significant
way one is nonetheless able to be tempted in the relevant
way or ways. My purpose in the chapters that follow is to
show that neither of these approaches succeeds in solving
the Temptation Problem.
Temptation is a common human experience. Temptation and
resistance to temptation are standard themes of almost any
religious or even secular morality. In our everyday speech
we often loosely speak of being "tempted" by this or that
object or action. We say that we are tempted to skip class,
for example, or that we are tempted by a box of chocolates.
We seem in these cases to mean, somewhat roughly, that we
sre allured by, attracted to, or at least seriously
considering those objects or actions. Another way of
understanding these "loose" versions of "tempt" is that we
mean by them that we are strongly disposed or inclined to do
something. If I say that I am tempted to buy a doughnut with
my midmorning coffee, I mean that I am strongly inclined to
buy (and eat!) a doughnut with my coffee at that time.
Sometimes "temptation" is used, especially Biblically, to
describe a test of faith. Many times religious persons see
temptations that come their way as tests of their faith: an
attractive person of whatever sex they are interested in may
present a "test" of their marriage vows and/or their
relationship with God. We might claim that Abraham is
tempted, in this usage of being "put to the proof", when God
orders him to sacrifice Isaac. It certainly seems that when
6we are enticed to do something immoral there is an element
of proof or testing in such an enticement; a test, that is,
of whether we can withstand the allure. Many writers seem to
portray Jesus' temptations in the wilderness as tests; the
Devil presents Jesus with a series of tests, on this view,
that he must pass to prove his ability (to withstand some
attractive or alluring possibility) in support of the claims
about his Messiahship. Even though the conclusion to such
tests seems foregone, in the case of Jesus, there is still a
proof of Jesus' ability to resist temptation by refusing the
Devil's offers. This is not intended to be an exhaustive
list of these everyday or "loose" uses of "tempt"; others
are easily imaginable.
The most important way in which one can be tempted,
however, is the kind of temptation in which someone or
something entices one to do something immoral or, perhaps,
unwise, with the promise of pleasure, gain, or reward. One
is tempted to commit a sin such as telling a lie, for
example, because one believes that telling the lie will give
one some advantage or perhaps allow one to escape
responsibility for something. Or someone may be tempted to
cheat on an exam with a goal in mind of getting into a
better graduate program or obtaining a more lucrative job.
This leaves us with the question of the sufficient
conditions for enticement. Webster suggests that one is
enticed when one is either drawn on, attracted, or lured by
the arousal of hope or desire. One who is tempted in this
7way is one who is attracted or lured (or drawn on) to do
something immoral (or perhaps unwise) by the arousal of hope
or desire for some pleasure, gain, or reward. Kazantzakis
'
s
depiction of Jesus' attraction to Mary Magdalene seems to
fit this description. Of course this kind of "temptation"
may have the "testing" aspect referred to above, but the
theologically interesting question about Jesus is not
whether he could be tested but whether he could be enticed
to do something immoral or, perhaps, unwise, with the
promise of pleasure, gain, or reward.
^
One further distinction will help us. Let's
distinguish, somewhat loosely, "internal" temptation from
"external" temptation. When my daughter Kelsey presents me
with a box of chocolate-covered candies, I am tempted
insofar as someone or something is presenting a potentially
alluring or at least attractive possibility to me. This is
what I am calling "external" temptation. If Kelsey tells me
that they are chocolate-covered cherries, I will also be
4. I am inclined to believe that these different ways or
kinds of temptation are actually different senses of the
term "tempt". One might argue for this by saying that it is
possible to say truly, "I am tempted to eat a donut this
morning, but I am not tempted to eat a donut this morning,"
without uttering a contradictory statement. I am attracted
by the possibility of eating a donut, that is to say, but I
am not thereby enticed or allured to do something immoral or
unwise with the promise or hope of gain or reward. I am not
sure that much turns on this point, however, and the
Biblical claim is simply that Jesus was tempted in every way
that we are. Certainly an important way of being tempted is
the way I have described above as being theologically
interesting. Thus the point I want to discuss throughout the
following chapters is whether Jesus could be tempted in that
way.
8attracted (perhaps even enticed) by the candies. This
attraction to or enticement by something or some action that
some agent feels is what I am calling "internal" temptation.
If she tells me that they are chocolate-covered ants, it is
unlikely that I will be attracted to or enticed by the
candies. We might say truly, in the case of the ants, that I
am tempted by the candies but also not tempted by them. l am
presented with something that might allure or entice me, but
it does not, in fact, so allure or entice me. When we
discuss claims such as "Jesus was tempted in every way that
we are", it is really not interesting to discuss whether he
was tempted externally; of course he was surrounded by the
same potentially alluring or attractive things as anyone
else who lived at the time. What is of interest is whether
he experienced internal temptation: whether any of those
things presented to him allured or enticed him to do
something immoral or unwise.
The real issue, then, in a discussion of the temptation
of Jesus is not simply whether he was tempted but whether he
was tempted in the theologically interesting way mentioned
above; that is, whether Jesus could feel enticed (allured or
attracted) to perform immoral or unwise acts with a promise
of pleasure, gain or reward. It seems plausible that the
Jesus of the orthodox tradition could be tempted by a box of
sweets in the way that we are without any threat to
doctrinal claims about his nature. But the same is not true
about the claim that Jesus was tempted in every way that we
9are. For that to be true it must be true that he could be
tempted in this last, interesting way. But that, as was
already mentioned, seems impossible. This is not a new
question; Christian thinkers from the earliest Fathers on
have mentioned or discussed Jesus' nature and the limits it
seems to place on his temptation. And the answer has
profound implications for Jesus as a moral example: how can
a human who cannot possibly sin be a useful or effective
moral role model or exemplar for situations of temptation?
Curiously, it seems that none of the traditional answers to
the Temptation Problem provides a solution adequate to
maintain the claims orthodox Christianity makes about Jesus
the Christ.
Anselm, for example, argues in Cur Deus Homo that it
was both impossible and possible for Jesus to sin. It was
impossible, obviously, because Jesus was necessarily morally
good. It was possible, he suggests, because Jesus was able
to utter words that could possibly be a lie (such as, "My
Father is not God") . In Chapter 2 I will discuss Jaspar
Hopkins's suggestions for why this approach fails. ^ Aquinas,
also, claims that Jesus can be tempted while retaining the
attribute of necessary moral goodness, but I believe his
approach results in a less than fully human Jesus. Jesus,
according to Aquinas, is not tainted by original sin because
5. Anselm of Canterbury, Cur Deus Homo , in St. Anselm: Basic
Writings . trans. by S.N. Deane, (La Salle, Illinois: Open
Court Publishing Company, 1962)
,
II, 10; Jaspar Hopkins, A
Companion to the Study of St. Anselm , (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1972), pp. 162-167.
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he IS not born of man and woman - his only human parent is a
woman (the passing on of the capacity to sin is apparently
sperm-specific for Aquinas). Unlike all of us, then, Jesus'
original justice is intact. Original justice is the quality
that Adam lost when he sinned; it was consequently lost for
the rest of us in Adam's sin. Jesus' divine nature ensured
that he lacked the ability to lose original justice, while
Adam, of course, had the ability to lose his original
justice. But the difference between Adam's ability to sin
and Jesus' apparent lack of that ability suggests that the
Thomistic Christ is not so fully human as one might wish; he
lacked the ability - and perhaps the freedom - to sin that
all the rest of us have. Such a capacity or ability seems,
one might argue, to be an essential characteristic of full
humanity. 6 This is discussed in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4 I
examine an interesting solution, by R.L. Sturch, to the
problem that it seems contradictory to claim, as C.L. Martin
does, that it is possible that Christ sinned and also
impossible that he sinned. In Chapter 5 I will examine the
claim that Thomas Morris makes defending the possibility of
Jesus' temptation while maintaining the necessary moral
goodness of Christ. In the rest of this chapter I will
discuss briefly how some of the early Christian thinkers
talked about temptation, with a special emphasis on the
teachings of Augustine. Augustine never exactly attempts to
6. Aquinas, Summa Theoloqiae . 3a. 14, 1; 3a. 15, 1; and
elsewhere.
11
solve the Temptation Problem, but he says enough about the
relevant subjects in his work to propose what might be
called an Augustinian solution.
The earliest mention of the claim that Jesus was
tempted are, of course, quotations from the New Testament.
Matthew 4, Mark 1, and Luke 4 tell the story of the
temptation of Jesus by the devil in the wilderness. Each of
these three gospels also contains, in the account of Jesus
waiting to be arrested in the garden of Gethsemane, Jesus'
admonition to the disciples to "pray that you may not enter
into temptation." In these passages "temptation" seems to be
used ambiguously
. On the one hand it means attraction to or
allure by an unwise or immoral act, while on the other hand
it also means a test or trial. Jesus comments on both the
inevitability of temptation and the sin of creating or
causing temptation in a story told in both Matthew 18 and
Luke 17, "Temptations to sin are sure to come, but woe to
him by whom they come. "’7 in Paul's first letter to Corinth
[7:5], he advises married couples not to abstain too long
from sexual relations, "lest Satan tempt you through lack of
self-control." Later in the same letter Paul warns against
overconfidence in one's ability to lead the holy life, while
at the same time promising that God will not allow anyone to
7. This is a slightly troublesome passage. The Greek here
actually reads something like "stumbling blocks are sure to
come...", but virtually every translation renders that term
as "temptations".
12
undergo a trial or allurement beyond his or her capacity to
endure
:
Therefore let anyone who thinks that he stands takeheed lest he fall. No temptation has overtaken you thatIS not common to humankind. God is faithful, and he
will not let you be tempted beyond your strength, butwith the temptation will also provide a way of escapethat you may be able to endure it. [10:12-13] '
Similarly, in Galatians 6:1, Paul recommends that, "if
a man is overtaken in any trespass, you who are spiritual
should restore him in a spirit of gentleness [and] look to
yourself, lest you too be tempted." In the letter of James,
an early Hellenistic Christian takes a strong stand on
temptation; indeed, this is perhaps the clearest definition
of temptation offered in the New Testament:
Blessed is the one who endures trial for when he has
stood the test he will receive the crown of life which
God has promised to those who love him. Let no one say
when he is tempted, "I am tempted by god"; for God
cannot be tempted with evil and he himself tempts no
one; but each person is tempted when he is lured and
enticed by his own desire
.[ 1 : 12-14
]
It is especially worthy of note here two claims that
James makes: God cannot be tempted with evil and each person
is tempted when he is lured by his own desire. These claims,
and similar claims, will figure prominently in later
discussion of the Temptation Problem.
Perhaps most relevant of the New Testament occurrences
of "temptation" are the following two passages from Hebrews.
The first is intended to explain part of the problem of why
God had to take on human form in order to work salvation:
Since therefore the children share in flesh and blood,
he himself likewise partook of the same nature, that
13
he might destroy him who has the power ofdevil, and deliver all those whofear of death were subject to lifelongbondage... Therefore he had to be made like his brethren
might become a mercifuland faithful high priest in the service of God, to make
people. For because hehimself has suffered and been tempted, he is able tohelp those who are tempted. [2
:
14 - 15
,
17-18]
The second passage asserts the central claim that Jesus
was tempted "in every way that we are, yet without sin".
Although there has been some discussion about how exactly to
interpret this passage (see below for Augustine's creative
version)
,
the main thrust seems clear and straightforward:
Jesus was tempted in all the ways that we are but, unlike
^11 of us, he did not ever succumb.
Since then we have a great high priest who has passed
through the heavens, Jesus, the Son of God, let us hold
fast our confession. For we have not a high priest who
is unable to sympathize with our weaknesses, but one
who in every respect has been tempted as we are, yet
without sin. Let us with confidence draw near to the
throne of grace, that we may receive mercy and find
grace to help in time of need. [4:14-16]
The non-Biblical literature dating from after the time
of Jesus makes mention of "temptation" mostly in terms of
the human moral situation, with little or no reference to
Jesus or his temptation. The Didache, a tract generally
believed to have been compiled before the end of the first
century after Jesus, includes an instruction to pray what we
call the "Lord's Prayer" three times daily; that prayer, of
course, asks that God "lead us not into temptation".®
8. Anonymous, The Didache . in The Didache . The Epistle of
Barnabas . The Epistles and Martyrdom of St. Polycarp, etc.
,
trans. by James A. Kleist, (Westminister, Maryland: The
Newman Press; London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1961), No. 6
in the Ancient Christian Writers . ed. by J. Quasten and J.C.
14
Polycarp, in his Epistle to the Philippians, written
somewhere around 140 A.D., seems to see "temptation" as
something best avoided. He enjoins his readers:
...Be temperate and ready for our prayers, persevere infasting, and fervently implore the All-seeing God 'notto expose us to temptation,' since the Lord has said
'The spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak.'^
Tertullian, writing sometime after the year 200 in An
Exhortation Chastity
,
clearly understands temptation as a
testing or trial, and sees even in the law a certain form of
temptation:
A permission is usually a test of character, because to
resist temptation is to prove one's mettle, and because
a permission is often itself a temptation. Thus it is,
then, that all things may be lawful, but not all are
expedient, since a man is subjected to a test when a
permission is granted him and it is on the basis of
this test in matters permitted that he is judged.
Of course temptation is more than this. Tertullian also
spoke of the "sins which beset us every day and to which we
are all tempted":
For who will not, as it may chance, fall into
unrighteous anger and continue this even beyond
sundown, or even strike another or, out of easy habit,
curse another, or swear rashly, or violate his pledged
faith, or tell a lie through shame or the compulsion of
circumstances? In the management of affairs, in the
performance of duties, in commercial transactions.
Plumpe (London: Longmans, Green, and Co.; Westminister,
Maryland: The Newman Press), p. 19.
9. Polycarp, Epistles to the Philippians . in Kleist, trans..
The Didache . The Epistle of Barnabas . The Epistles and
Martyrdom of St. Polvcarp . etc., p. 79.
10. Tertullian, ^ Exhortation to Chastity . in Treatises on
Marriage and Remarriage . trans. by William P. Le Saint,
(Westminister, Maryland: The Newman Press; London: Longmans,
Green, and Co.
,
1956)
,
No. 13 in the Ancient Christian
Writers . ed. by J. Quasten and J.C. Plumpe (London:
Longmans, Green, and Co.; Westminister, Maryland: The Newman
Press)
,
p. 55
.
15
tempted?^^^^'
looking, listening - how often we are
Even though the devil, "that stubborn enemy of ours",
may be the occasion or originator of temptations that we are
faced with, Tertullian argued quite strongly about the free
nature of our choices to sin (or not, of course). He points
out that
...we ought not to ascribe to God's will something
which has been the subject of our own free choice,
since he who wishes the good does not wish
evil .. .Accordingly
,
it is of our own volition that we
choose what is evil against the will of God, who wishes
what is good. And if you ask me whence comes this
volition of ours by which we set our will against the
^lll of God, I should reply that it comes from our own
selves. Nor is this rashly said, if, indeed, Adam the
author of our race and of our fall, willed the sin
which he committed; for you yourself must needs be like
the father whose seed you are. The devil did not force
on Adam the choice of sin, but merely supplied him with
an object he might choose... So you also, should you
disobey the Lord, who gave you the power of free choice
along with His command, will, of your own volition,
turn aside to what He does not desire.
Origen, who wrote in what might be called the next
generation after Tertullian (approximately 230-250)
,
saw
temptation as a constant challenge that was central to the
life of humanity. Although all of the early Christian
writers undoubtedly knew of the story of Jesus' temptation,
Origen seems to be one of the first to discuss Jesus'
relation to our temptation. In his Commentary on the Song of
Songs . Origen develops the metaphor of temptation as a net.
11. Tertullian, On Purity , in Treatises on Penance , trans.
by William P. Le Saint, (Westminister, Maryland: The Newman
Press; London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1959), No. 28 in
the Ancient Christian Writers
.
ed. by J. Quasten and W.J.
Burghardt, (London: Longmans, Green, and Co.; Westminister,
Maryland: The Newman Press)
,
p. 114 (see also pp. 28-29)
.
12. Tertullian, An Exhortation to Chastity , p. 20.
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set to trap humans in much the same way that similar nets
might trap birds or snares might trap deer:
The just man, if he have fallen into sin, is
commanded to 'flee as a doe from the snares, and as abird from the nets.' The life of men... is full ofdeadly offenses, full of the nets of fraudwhich he who is called 'Nemrod, the giant hunter
against the Lord, ' spreads for the human race. For whoIS in fact that giant, save the devil, who rebels even
against God? So the snares of temptations and the
craftily contrived gins of the devil are called nets. 13
The metaphors of "snares" and "nets" for temptation
seem appropriate for expressing the dual nature of
temptation: it both allures one to sin and tests one's
commitment to the covenant with God. In this creative
commentary on the relevant passage in the Song of Songs,
Origen argued that the presence of these "nets" throughout
and the likelihood that we would all be caught in
them, required that "somebody should come who should be
stronger than they and stand out above them and should
destroy them, and thus clear the way for those who followed
him." Of course the only one who could be stronger than the
nets is one who is without sin, but even this must be
demonstrated through a testing:
Therefore is the Saviour also tempted by the devil
before He could enter into union and alliance with the
Church; so that, conquering the snares of temptations.
He might look through them and through them also call
her to Himself, thus teaching and showing her beyond
13. Origen, Commentary on the Song of Songs, (Westminister,
Maryland: The Newman Press; London: Longmans, Green, and Co.
1957)
,
No. 26 in the Ancient Christian Writers, ed. by J.
Quasten and J.C. Plumpe, (London: Longmans, Green, and Co.;
Westminister, Maryland: The Newman Press), p. 237. See
Proverbs 1:17 and 6:5 for the net reference, and see Genesis
10:8ff. for the story of Nemrod.
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all doubt that the way to Christ leads, not throuqhIdle ease and pleasure, but through many trials andtemptations.
There was, therefore, none other who could overcomethese nets. 'For all have sinned', as it is written*
and again, as Scripture says; 'there is no just man
upon earth that hath done good and hath not sinned'*
and again: 'No one is free of uncleanness, not even ifhis life be but of one day.' Therefore our Lord andSaviour Jesus Christ alone is He 'who did no sin'; butthe Father 'made Him to be sin for us', that 'in thelikeness of sinful flesh and of sin He might condemn
sin. '
So He came to these nets; but He alone could not be
caught in them. Instead of that, when He has torn and
trampled them. He so emboldens the Church that she too
dares to trample now upon the snares, and to pass over
the nets, and with all joy to say: 'Our soul has been
delivered out of the snare of the fowlers; the snare is
broken, and we are delivered. ' Who rent the snare, save
He alone who could not be held by it? For, although He
suffered death. He did so willingly, and not as we do,
by necessity of sin; for He alone was 'free among the
dead '.14
Origen is a good illustration of the source of the
Temptation Problem: the language used to describe Jesus
incarnate is that he came in the "likeness of sinful flesh
and of sin," and even the somewhat mysterious claim that God
"made Him to be sin for us" maintains a certain distance (or
at least the possibility of such distance) between Jesus'
human nature and ours. The problem is not yet explicit, but
we can see in Origen 's discussion of "nets and snares" the
possibility of some confusion if the point of Jesus' dual
nature is pressed.
The importance of resisting temptations is stressed
also by Jerome, a famous teacher and translator who lived
14. Origen, Commentary on the Song of Songs , pp. 237-238.
See Romans 3:23; Job 14:4 f.; I Peter 2:22 (citing Isaiah
53:9), II Corinthians 5:21, and Romans 8:3; Psalm 123:7;
Acts 2:24; and Psalm 87:6.
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from 347 until 419 or 420. Jerome is probably best known for
producing the Latin Vulgate version of the Bible, but he is
also known for his teaching and advice on the Christian
life. He points out the centrality of "tranquillity of
thought" and the need for one's soul to have its "faith
founded on a rock and fixed with a deep root" in order to
ensure that the "billows of temptations" will not pass over
one who is tempted.
Palladius, writing at about the time of Jerome's death
(419 or so) in his Lausiac History
, mentions a number of
temptations presented to him or to the monastics whose life
he describes. These temptations apparently took the form of
carnal desires, Ethiopian maidens, messengers with food, or
onslaughts by demons. The temptations actually seemed to be
invited by the monastics, who would spend years in their
cells testing their ability to withstand temptation by
"prayer and fasting." In short, Palladius seemed to see
temptation as a combination of testing and the enticement to
immoral acts.^^
15. Jerome, The Letters of St . Jerome
. trans. by Charles C.
Meirow, (Westminister, Maryland: The Newman Press; London:
Longmans, Green, and Co., 1963), No. 33 in the Ancient
Christian Writers
. ed. by J. Quasten and W.J. Burghardt,
(London: Longmans, Green, and Co.; Westminister, Maryland:
The Newman Press), p. 101. Jerome's mixed metaphor here adds
a certain solidity to his point.
16. Palladius: The Lausiac History . trans. by Robert T.
Meyer, (Westminister, Maryland: The Newman Press; London:
Longmans, Green, and Co., 1965), No. 34 in the Ancient
Christian Writers . ed. by J. Quasten, W.J. Burghardt, T.C.
Lawler, (London: Longmans, Green, and Co.; Westminister,
Maryland: The Newman Press), pp. 54, 79, 82-3, 114, 189.
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Some early Christians saw temptation not only as a
testing but also as a reminder of the need for humility.
Prosper of Aquitaine, for example, writing in about 450,
follows Paul and Augustine in reminding his readers in The
of Nations that "obviously, there are occasions for
struggle and these serve the great profit of the faithful:
their weakness is buffeted that their holiness may not yield
to pride. "17 prosper points out that God's various gifts are
given to be used:
...God does not give continence to allow a man not to
resist his inordinate desires. He does not give wisdom
and understanding to dispense a man from meditating on
the Lord's law day and night. What can the gift of
charity effect if a man is not ever animated by a
desire to help others? ... God ' s grace does not make any
one proof against temptation. The Christian soldier is
not equipped with heavenly weapons, both offensive and
defensive, in order not to fight with the enemy;
because it brings greater glory and happiness to come
through battle invincible than to prove unassailable
because of indolence. 1®
Maximus, a theologian and philosopher who lived from
about 580-660, wrote extensively on the ascetic life. He
viewed temptation as the activity of the devil, and saw
Jesus' temptation as a test of Jesus' ability to "observe
[the two commandments of the law]
,
in human fashion, from
beginning to end." Thus Jesus took himself out to the desert
17. Prosper of Aquitaine, The Call of All Nations . trans. by
J. Quasten, (Westminister, Maryland: The Newman Press;
London: Longmans, Green, and Co. 1952)
,
No. 14 in the
Ancient Christian Writers . ed. by J. Quasten and J.C.
Plumpe, (London: Longmans, Green, and Co.; Westminister,
Maryland: The Newman Press), p. 39.
18. Prosper, The Call of All Nations
. pp. 150-151.
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to be "tempted by himself", which activity the devil was
more than happy to assist:
...as the devil knew that there are three things bywhich every human is moved - l mean food, money, andreputation, and it is by these too that he leads mendown to the depths of destruction - with these samethree he tempted Him in the desert.
Jesus, of course, successfully resisted the temptation,
but Maximus goes even further, declaring that the "wicked
Pharisees and Scribes" were stirred up by the "vindictive"
devil to plot against Jesus in order to make Christ hate
those who schemed against Him. The devil thus tried to fool
Jesus into breaking the commandment "love thy neighbor";
this, too is a form of temptation or test. 20
In addition to Jesus' temptation, Maximus had something
to say about our temptations. Just after the passages cited
above, Maximus offers this admonishment:
If you are always attentive to what has been said above
[about Paul's instructions concerning struggling with
temptation, in addition to Jesus' experience], you can
have that awareness [of being sober minded in time of
temptations, and of the schemes of the devil and his
demons], but provided you understand that as you are
tempted, so also your brother is tempted; that you
pardon the tempted and, by refusing to respond to his
trick, withstand the Tempter, who wants to bring you to
a hatred of the tempted. 21
In another of Maximus's writings, the Four Centuries on
Charity , the author presents some instructions on the nature
19. Maximus the Confessor, The Ascetic Life, trans. by
Polycarp Sherwood, (Westminister, Maryland: The Newman
Press; London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1955), No. 21 in
the Ancient Christian Writers . ed. by J. Quasten and J.C.
Plumpe, (London: Longmans, Green, and Co.; Westminister,
Maryland: The Newman Press), p. 108-109.
20. Maximus, The Ascetic Life, p. 109-110.
21. Maximus, The Ascetic Life, p. 113.
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Of temptation in the monastic life and how to handle it. in
Century I, for example, he enjoins the brethren not to leave
the monastery in time of temptation, but rather to "nobly
bear the waves of thoughts, especially those of grief and
listlessness . "22 in Century II the problem of blaming the
of temptation is addressed; the reader is enjoined
"to seek the why of it" in order to find correction,
because, no matter through whom the temptation was brought,
"the fact is you had to drain the wormwood of God's
judgments. "23 Here, of course, temptation has the dual
nature of being both a test and an inducement to some
immoral or unwise act. In Century IV, Maximus points out two
of the side problems connected with temptation: it can be
long-lasting and it can lead to trouble with others. He
notes that "the long-suffering man awaits the end of
temptation and attains the triumph of perseverance," and
If perhaps in temptation your brother insists on
abusing you, do not be carried away from your
charitable dispositions, suffering the same wicked
demon to infest your mind. And you will not be carried
away if, being reviled, you bless, being tricked, you
remain well-disposed. This is the philosophic way
according to Christ; who will not walk it, does not
enjoy his company. 24
Apparently Augustine and Gregory the Great discerned
two kinds of temptation, temptation which tended to issue in
22. Maximus the Confessor, The Four Centuries on Charity ,
trans. by Polycarp Sherwood, (Westminister, Maryland: The
Newman Press; London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1955), No.
21 in the Ancient Christian Writers, ed. by J. Quasten and
J.C. Plumpe, (London: Longmans, Green, and Co.;
Westminister, Maryland: The Newman Press), p. 143.
23. Maximus, The Four Centuries on Charity , p. 160.
24. Maximus, The Four Centuries on Charity , p. 195-196.
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Sin and temptation which simply put to the test, m his book
The Lord •
s
Sermon on the Mount
. Augustine draws a
distinction between "being tempted" and "being led into
temptations" . 25 The first of these we might think of as
external temptation, or the situation of being presented
with or faced with a temptation. An obvious example of this
is the set of temptations that the Devil presents to Jesus
in the Wilderness. To "fall into temptation" or "to be led
into temptation" describes a situation in which, according
to Augustine, the temptations "are such that we cannot
endure"
.
In a short but important passage in the City of God
.
Augustine seems to suggest that we ought to distinguish
between normal temptations and temptations which contain an
element of sin in them (most of what we would call sensual,
and certainly sexual temptations, have this element of sin)
.
It is instructive, as one reads this passage, to recall that
Augustine is arguing against a class of philosophers who
maintain that the "supreme good is in themselves". Some
claim it is in the body or the soul, while others claim it
is in pleasure or in virtue. In the passage below, then,
Augustine explains that the maintenance of virtue
presupposes the existence of vice within the virtuous
person:
25. Augustine, The Lord ' s Sermon on the Mount
.
trans. by
John J. Jepson, (Westminister, Maryland: The Newman Press,
1956)
,
No. 5 in Ancient Christian Writers . ed. by Johannes
Quasten and Joseph C. Plumpe, (Westminister, Maryland: The
Newman Press), pp. 118-123.
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In fine, virtue itself, which is not among the primarvobjects of nature, but succeeds to them as the result^of learning, though it holds the highest place amonqhuman good things, what is its occupation save to wageperpetual war with vices - not those that are outside
not other men's, but our own - a warwhich IS waged especially by that virtue which the
spEhrosune, and we temperance, and whichbridles carnal lusts, and prevents them from winningthe consent of the spirit to evil deeds? For we must
not fancy that there is no vice in us, when, as the
apostle says, "The flesh lusteth against the
spirit" [Gal. 5:17]; for to this vice there is a
contrary virtue, when, as the same writer says, "The
spirit lusteth against the flesh." "For these two," he
says, "are contrary one to the other, so that you'
cannot do the things which you would." But what is it
we wish to do when we seek to attain the supreme good,
unless that the flesh should cease to lust against the
spirit, and that there be no vice in us against which
the spirit may lust? And as we cannot attain to this in
the present life, however ardently we desire it, let usby God's help accomplish at least this, to preserve the
soul from succumbing and yielding to the flesh that
lusts against it, and to refuse our consent to the
P®^P®^^^tion of sin. Far be it from us, then to fancy
that while we were still engaged in this intestine war,
we have already found the happiness which we seek to
reach by victory. And who is there so wise that he has
no conflict at all to maintain his vices?26
Aquinas interprets this passage as a clear statement
that Augustine believes that "There is some sin whenever
'the desire of the flesh opposes the spirit'", from which he
(Aquinas) concludes that Christ could not have been tempted
in this way! 27 There is significant evidence for this view
of Jesus' inability to sin elsewhere in the Augustinian
corpus . In Chapter XV of On Nature and Grace
.
written
26. Augustine, City of God
.
Book XIX, Chap. IV, in Basic
Writings of St . Augustine . vol. 2, ed. by Whitney J. Oates,
(New York: Random House, 1948), pp. 475-476.
27. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae . vol. 53, 3a. 38-45,
trans. by R.J. Hennessy, O.P., (New York: Blackfriars, in
conjunction with McGraw-Hill Book Company and London: Eyre &
Spotiswoode, 1976), p. 75, 3a. 41,1.
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against Pelagius and Pelagianisin, Augustine makes an aside
concerning Jesus:
.. .in. ..Scripture.
. .it is nowhere found that any man isdescribed as being without sin, except Him only, of
whom it is plainly said, that "He knew no sin." [iiCor. 5:21] Similarly we read in the passage where the
subject IS concerning priests: "He was in all pointstempted as we are, only without sin" [Heb. 4:15] -
meaning, of course, in that flesh which bore thelikeness of sinful flesh, although it was not sinfulflesh; a likeness, indeed, which it would not haveborne if it had not been in every other respect the
same as sinful flesh. 28
Of course Augustine stoutly denies that God has the
ability to sin, and Christ, who is one with God in the
Trinity, shares God's nature and thus has the same inability
to sin. 29 v/hat is most interesting for our purposes is
Augustine's reading of Hebrews 4:15. One somewhat standard
way of reading this verse is to understand that while Jesus
was tempted in every way that we are, he was nonetheless
able to withstand all of those temptations. Augustine's
comment here, however, suggests another reading. Augustine's
reading seems to say that Christ was tempted in only those
ways that we are that do not have as part of their
temptation an element of sin. Certainly this is the way
Aguinas understands him, and Aguinas cites the passage
quoted above from the City of God in support of his reading
of Augustine.
28. Augustine, ^ Nature and Grace, in Basic Writings of St.
Augustine . vol. 1, ed. by Whitney J. Oates, (New York:
Random House, 1948), p. 529.
29. Augustine, ^ Nature and Grace , p. 556-558.
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It is worth noting here that the Greek of Hebrews 4 ns
does not exactly support either Augustine's reading or the
more standard interpretation, which I will refer to as the
"modern interpretation" . 30 One issue for the modern
interpretation has to do with whether this verse (as well as
Hebrews 2:18) indicates that Jesus was tempted by being
allured or attracted to do an immoral thing or that he was
tempted by being tested or tried. Not much turns on that,
however, since in either case he was tempted "in every
respect as we are". Although this reading suggests a way out
of the dilemma of how Jesus could be a moral model for us
without being able to sin himself, that apparent "way out"
actually falls prey to the same problem. Someone may claim,
for example, that Jesus was tested in every way that we are,
and yet he did not sin in response to any of the tests. But
this reading also fails to make Jesus a real role model for
any other humans, because being presented with tests when
one cannot fail them is the same, morally, as being
presented with attractions or allurements when one cannot
actually succumb to the attraction or allure.
30. Transliterated, the verse reads something like this: Ou
gar echomen archierea me dunamenon sumpathesai tais
astheneiais hemon, pepeirasmenon de kata panta hath
homoioteta choris amartais, "Pepeirasmenon" may mean "having
been tried or tested" more than "having been tempted" in the
sense, suggested in Chapter One, of "attracted or allured by
an immoral or unwise action". See A Grammatical Analysis of
the Greek New Testament
.
by Max Zerwick and Mary Grosvenor,
(Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1981), esp. p. 662. This is
not without some controversy, however.
26
The Augustinian reading, that Jesus was tempted (in
whatever way, most likely "tested") only in those ways that
are in themselves free of sin, seems plausible enough, but
it also presents serious problems. Obviously no one with a
necessarily morally good nature can be tempted in a way that
has as part of its makeup an element of sin, so Jesus could
not have been tempted in those ways, according to
Augustine. He was tempted, rather, in every way that we
are that was logically possible for someone who was unable
to sin in virtue of his divine nature. Jesus, although his
flesh bore the likeness of sinful flesh, was not exactly
like the rest of us who actually have "sinful flesh". As
Augustine points out, this is because Jesus' "flesh" does
not have the same defect that the rest of us have; that is,
he was free of the taint of original sin. Because Jesus was
not born of a standard human parents, he does not inherit
original sin, so his "flesh" will not resemble ours in this
very important (and logically necessary) way.32
There is, of course, a huge problem with this. That
problem is that it severely limits Jesus as any sort of role
31. See his City of God . XIX, par. 4 for a singularly
unclear explanation of this position.
32. See, for example, Augustine's City of God . Book XIV,
Chapter III, in the Basic Writings of St. Augustine , vol. 2,
(New York: Random House, 1948), pp. 241-242: "But if anyone
says that the flesh is the cause of all vices and ill
conduct, inasmuch as the soul lives wickedly only because it
is moved by the flesh, it is certain he has not considered
the whole nature of man... For the corruption of the body,
which weighs down the soul, is not the cause but the
punishment of the first sin; and it was not the corruptible
flesh that made the soul sinful, but the sinful soul that
made the flesh corruptible."
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model or exemplar for humanity. If Jesus was only tempted in
certain ways, but not in others, then the claim that Jesus
took on human form (and nature) is vitiated. Nor does it
seem to be entirely true to the Biblical account of Jesus.
Frankly, this is not much help.
In contrast to Augustine, Caesarius of Arles seemed to
take a different tack to explain away the Temptation
Caesarius was at some pains to explain Jesus*
triumph over sin without attaching too much importance to
Jesus' divine nature. For Caesarius, although he is somewhat
vague in this crucial passage, Augustine apparently did not
take a strong enough line:
For this reason, then, our Lord and Saviour came "in
the likeness of sinful flesh" (Rom. 8:3), as the
Apostle teaches, and bore all things, though without
sin Himself. By taking upon Himself flesh from a sinful
substance, while remaining without sin. He thus
fulfilled justice and condemned sin in the body. This
fact is proved by His conflict in the desert, for the
Devil is not overcome by divine Majesty, but by a
reminder of the commandment, by fasting, and by a legal
reply. The different temptations of the Pharisees
further proved it, for they often attacked our Lord. By
doing good even though they were ungrateful, not
resisting injury, overcoming insult with patience, and
malice with kindness, all justice surely is fulfilled
and every sin condemned. As a result of this, our Lord
declared: "The prince of this world is coming, and in
me he has nothing." (John 14:30) Therefore this is the
first victory, that a body could appear sinless though
taken from a sinful race. Thus, sin could be condemned
in the very body in which it had thought it could
reign; instead, that which had once been overcome would
now conquer. If His divinity alone had been victorious,
it would not have been a source of great confusion to
the Devil, nor would corporeal men have had confidence
in the triumph.
33. Caesarius of Arles, Sermons . vol. I, trans. by Mary
Magdalene Mueller, (New York: Fathers of the Church, Inc.,
1956)
,
p. 64.
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Unfortunately, Caesarius presents no defense of this
claim, that it was not "divine majesty alone" that had
triumphed, but something else. Surely it is not simply "a
reminder of divine commandment" or a "legal reply" (or even
fasting!) that enables Jesus to resist temptations that the
rest of us struggle with. Rather, Caesarius seems to imply
that within human flesh itself is the capability to
withstand temptation, but that only Jesus has been able to
tap into that source of strength or will so as to resist the
temptations that any human might face. This is a position
significantly different from Augustine's - and one with real
promise for explaining the Temptation Problem, but so far as
I can tell Caesarius does not develop it beyond the passage
quoted above. In the last chapter I will return to the
tension between this idea and Augustine's limitations on
Jesus' temptation.
CHAPTER 2
ON ANSELM'S SOLUTION
As we have seen, it seems to follow from orthodox
Christian doctrine that Jesus' life and example are not
relevant to our human moral concerns. Jesus, in his divine
nature, is essentially morally good, which means that he
cannot, of necessity, perform any morally wrong action.
Although he may be "like us in every respect", ^ if it is not
possible for Jesus to sin he does not share at least one
that every other human hast the ability or capacity
(or even the possibility) to sin. In apparent conflict with
the claim about Christ's necessary moral goodness is the
claim that he was also fully human; he had a human nature
(or rational soul) just as every other human does. And it
seems that the claim that he was tempted (Hebrews 2:17)
implies that he was able to sin, or that it was possible for
Jesus to sin.
After Augustine and Caesarius, little seems to have
been written on this topic until the time of Anselm of
Canterbury. In Chapter Ten of Book II of his Cur Deus Homo
.
Anselm presents two arguments that, taken together, purport
to show that Jesus could and could not sin. The first of
these, which we will call Boso's Argument, is uttered by
Boso (named after Anselm's assistant). He argues that Jesus
1. Hebrews 2:13; see also 4:15.
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was able to lie because Jesus was able to utter words which,
spoken in certain contexts, would constitute a lie. The
second argument, Anselm's Reply to Boso, is based on the
notion that one cannot commit certain acts unless one wills
to commit those acts. Using this idea, Anselm attempts to
show that Jesus cannot, in fact, sin. These arguments will
be discussed in some detail below. One noticeable trait of
these arguments is the small controversy that they have
generated between at least two commentators on Anselm's
work. Desmond Paul Henry, in his book The Logic of Saint
Anselm, calls the first argument "a rather neat proof that
Christ was capable of lying". 2 But Jasper Hopkins, in A
Companion to the Study of St . Anselm
. argues that "there is
no meaningful sense in which Jesus could have lied, granted
Anselm's orthodox Christology" .
^
In this chapter I will examine these two arguments in
order to see whether Anselm has successfully solved the
problem of Christ's ability to sin. We will see that, while
Boso ' s Argument seems to fail, it is nonetheless based on a
tantalizing intuition about Christ's capacity to perform a
morally wrong action. In the latter part of the chapter I
will attempt to formulate Anselm's intuition into a workable
proof. First I will discuss Boso's Argument, the argument
that Jesus could sin, after which I will discuss Anselm's
2. Desmond Paul Henry, The Logic of St. Anselm . (London:
Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 1967), p. 168.
3. Jaspar Hopkins, A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm ,
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1972) , p. 166.
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Reply, the argument that Jesus could not sin. Then I will
take up the possibility of restructuring Anselm's argument
to see whether a successful version of it is available to
us.
In the Cur Deus Homo Anselm discusses the need for a
person of the "race of Adam" to make atonement for the sins
of Adam and his descendants. At the beginning of Chapter Ten
of Book II, he asserts that Jesus does not die as a debt for
his own sins, since he has none. This is because Jesus
cannot sin, of course, "for he is God". The rest of us die
as a part of our own debt for Adam's sin (and our own). Thus
Jesus' death can pay our debt, since he owes none.^ This
claim arouses Boso's curiosity, for he thinks he can show
that Jesus could sin. It is instructive to recount Boso's
speech in its entirety:
Boso: Let me delay you a little on this point. For in
either case it is no slight question with me whether it
be said that he can sin or that he cannot. For if it be
said that he cannot sin, it should seem hard to
believe. For to say a word concerning him, not as of
one who never existed in the manner we have spoken
hitherto, but as of one whom we know and whose deeds we
know; who, I say, will deny that he could have done
many things which we call sinful? For, to say nothing
of other things, how shall we say that it was not
possible for him to commit the sin of lying? For, when
he says to the Jews, of his Father, "If I say that I
know him not, I shall be a liar, like unto you," and,
in this sentence, makes use of the words: "I know him
not," who says that he could not have uttered these
same four words, or expressing the same thing
differently, have declared, "I know him not?" Now had
he done so, he would have been a liar, as he himself
4. Anselm of Canterbury, Cur Deus Homo , in S.N. Deane,
trans., St. Anselm: Basic Writings
.
(La Salle, Illinois:
Open Court Publishing Company, 1962), pp. 250-252.
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says, and therefore a sinner
do this, he could sin. 5
We can tentatively formulate this
Therefore, since he could
argument as follows:
Boso ' s Argument i
uttered the words "I know Him not" (where
God) as part of a certain sentence.
(2) If (1) , then he could have uttered the words "lknow Him not" as an independent declaration.
(3) If Jesus could have uttered the words "I know Him
not" as an independent declaration, then Jesus couldlie.
j4) If Jesus could lie, then Jesus could sin.
(5) Therefore Jesus could sin.
Premise (l) is taken from John 8:55; it refers to a
particular sentence (actually, part of a sentence) that was
reportedly uttered by Jesus. We are to understand that the
sentence "I know him (the Father) not", if uttered by Jesus,
is false. Premise (2) simply says that, if Jesus could utter
these words under the conditions of (1) , then he could utter
them under other conditions. One example of such other
conditions is an independent utterance of the sentence "I
know him not". Premise (3) claims that Jesus' ability to
utter the independent sentence referred to above amounts to
the ability to lie. If Jesus could perform even this one
sin, then it can be said truly of him that he could sin.
D.P. Henry, in The Logic of St . Anselm , refers to
Boso's Argument (as mentioned above) as a "rather neat proof
that Christ was capable of lying". ^ It is incorrect to
suggest that Henry analyzed this particular passage in any
5. Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, p. 251-252.
6. Henry, The Logic of St. Anselm
,
p. 168.
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way; he seems to give it this endorsement simply on face
value. Here is his comment:
...Since (Jesus) asserted (concerning God the Father)
that I know Him not, then I will be ayou'/, and this assertion actually involvesthe lying words 'I know Him not', there can be no doubtas to Christ's capacity to utter them; hence Christ
could lie.°
But there seem to be some problems with this
assessment. Christ's capacity to utter the crucial words is
not in doubt; certainly Christ could utter any of the words
his Palestinian contemporaries could utter. Just what it
means to say that the words are "lying words" is unclear;
indeed, it is not at all clear that "words" can be
accurately described with the adjective "lying". It does
seem, however, that Henry does not want to claim (nor does
Anselm) that "lying words" constitute a lie. Thus almost
whatever the phrase "lying words" turns out to mean, it need
not follow that the capacity or ability to utter them is the
same thing as the capacity or ability to lie. Since Henry
has no more than this to say on the argument, I will proceed
to Hopkins in order to examine Boso's Argument, as well as
Henry's endorsement of it, more fully.
Hopkins fashions a criticism of Boso's Argument based
in large part on what we will call Anselm's Reply (see
below). Central to Anselm's Reply is the claim that if
someone cannot will to perform a certain action then he or
she cannot perform that action.
7. John 8:55.
8. Henry, The Logic of St . Anselm
, p. 169.
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Here is the relevant passage from Hopkins:
really saying something like this:Although the God-man was conditionally able to tell alie He could never actually tell a lie, becausefulfillment of the condition under which He could do soIS logically impossible (by definition the God-man
cannot will a lie)". But because of this impossible
condition, Anselm should say outright that Jesus couldnot have sinned by telling a lie - instead of
maintaining that he was able to tell a lie but not ableto will a lie. For if someone cannot will a lie, thenhe can in no sense tell a lie. (This principle holds
^^^®spective of the reason why such a person
cannot will a lie).^
Hopkins's point seems to be this. Boso's claim that
Jesus can lie is simply false. This is because in order to
lie one must will to lie. It is not possible, however, for
the God-man to will to lie, since he is essentially morally
perfect, and to will a lie would be a moral imperfection. So
he simply cannot lie. It is not possible for him to lie.
Although this seems, at first, to be a reasonable and
telling objection to Boso's Argument, it is not entirely
clear which premise, exactly, Hopkins is rejecting. He
seems, actually, to be simply rejecting the conclusion,
which is hardly a telling objection. A somewhat more careful
(or, perhaps, generous) reading, however, might indicate
that Hopkins is pointing out that the consequent of premise
(4) is impossible. Hopkins is not entirely clear about this
in his discussion of Boso's Argument. He claims:
...there is rip meaningful sense in which Jesus could
have lied, granted Anselm's orthodox Christology
.
9. Hopkins, Companion
, pp. 164-165.
10. Hopkins, Companion
, p. 166.
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Anselm's orthodox Christianity has as one of its
tenets, of course, that it is impossible for Christ to sin.
Since willing to sin is also a sin, it is even impossible
for Christ to will to sin. Let us grant for now that we will
put aside the problems with the potential differences
between claims about Christ and claims about Jesus. Hopkins
denies that there is any meaningful sense "in which Jesus
could have lied" and, to be fair, if that is true then there
is no meaningful sense in which Christ could have lied,
either.
Hopkins denies that Jesus could have lied by saying
that it was impossible for Jesus to will a lie, because even
Anselm claims that Jesus could not have willed to sin.
Christ, because of the moral perfection of his fully divine
nature, could not have willed to lie.H Certainly, this
seems plausible, since to will a lie is a sin every bit as
much as actually lying (we have hinted at this earlier,
where we discussed the claim that Christ could not intend to
lie) . If we understand there to be no distinction between
Christ and Jesus for Anselm, then Jesus does not have the
capacity to will a lie. Hopkins' point is that the
impossibility of Jesus willing to lie precludes the
possibility of his actually lying. So Jesus can have no
capacity to lie if it is not possible that he actually lie.
11. See Cur Deus Homo . Chapter 10.
In fact, as Hopkins notes, 12 Anselm tacitly acknowledges
this problem:
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So we can say of Christ, that he could lie, so long aswe understand If he chose to do so. And since he couldnot lie unwillingly and could not wish to lie, none theless can it be said that he could not lie.^^
We will discuss this more below. Hopkins sees it as the
primary problem for Anselm that he (Anselm) does not
acknowledge that this argument refutes Boso's Argument.
There also seems to be a better way to reject Boso's
Argument. Premise (3) seems guestionable, at best. Henry
defends it in the quotation above. It is not entirely clear
what Henry means there by "lying words". One reasonable
assumption would be that "lying words" refers to what we
usually mean when we say "a lie"; that is, it means
something relevantly like "a false (or, perhaps, misleading)
statement knowingly uttered with the intent to deceive". But
it seems certain that this is not what Henry means when he
uses the term "lying words" to refer to the phrase "I know
him not" that Jesus utters as part of a longer statement. It
is clear in that case that Jesus does not utter the words "I
know him not" with the intent to deceive. So "lying words"
must mean something else.
A second possibility is that Henry intends "lying
words" to mean something relevantly like "false statement",
provided that we understand that to mean a false statement
uttered under certain conditions. That is, when Jesus utters
12. Hopkins, Companion
, p. 166.
11. Anselm, Cur Deus Homo
.
p. 253.
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the "lying words", "i know Him not," he is actually uttering
something that, under certain conditions, is false. On this
view intent is not relevant. The argument that follows from
this is that if Jesus can utter a statement that is false
under certain conditions, then he can lie. In fact, of
course, he has already uttered the statement "I know Him
not", which is false under certain conditions, so he is
obviously able to do so. It is the case, then, that he can
lie.
The problem with this argument is, of course, that the
simple utterance of a statement that would be false under
certain conditions does not imply the ability to tell a lie.
Nor would the ability to utter such a statement. Someone
might, for example, utter a false statement unknowingly or
mistakenly. That is not a lie, nor would such utterances
imply the ability to lie. Anselm, or Henry, may respond that
"lying words" are not simply untrue or false statements.
They are, these objectors might say, false statements
uttered or written with the knowledge that they are false.
If I were to say "School is closed for the day", knowing
that to be false, then I would be speaking "lying words",
according to this objection: uttering or somehow
communicating a false statement even though I know it to be
false. This, my Anselmian objectors claim, is what Jesus was
capable of: he could utter a false statement knowing that it
was, in fact, false. He could say, for example, "I know Him
not" (referring to the Father)
,
knowing that it was false.
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Thus he was capable of lying. But this possibility fails as
well. There are certainly lots of circumstances where
someone's knowing utterance of a false statement does not
constitute lying, in the case above, I might know that
school is not, in fact closed for the day. But simply
uttering the statement "School is closed for the day" does
not, by itself, constitute either a lie or the ability to
lie. If I am standing in an empty room where no one can hear
me, for example, then it does not seem that simply uttering
those words constitutes a lie. Nor does such an action imply
that I am capable of lying. In that case I have knowingly
uttered a false statement, but I have not lied. Hopkins
makes this point as follows:
Anselm, through Boso, seems to be thinking of a lie as
simply the utterance of a false statement, so that had
Jesus ever uttered the words "I do not know the Father"
and only these words, he would have been lying. Yet
the contrary is evident: Jesus could have spoken these
words without lying, for He could have said them
hypothetically. If His accusers had asked, "What would
you have to say in order to be a liar like us?" He
might didactically have answered, "I do not know the
Father." But with these words he would not have been
telling a lie even though he would have been giving an
example of a lie by saying something false.
Where Henry understands Boso's Argument as claiming
that, since Jesus was capable of uttering "lying words",
then he was capable of lying, he has defended an implication
that is not, in fact, a valid inference. This glosses over a
serious mistake in Boso's reasoning. That mistake is to
14
. Hopkins, Companion
. pp. 165-166.
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suppose that the ability to utter a false statement, even
knowingly, implies the ability to lie.
It is probably most accurate, as we suggested above, to
characterize a "lie" as something like "a false statement
that is knowingly uttered with the intention to deceive".
Thus when Boso claims that Jesus could lie, he is claiming
that Jesus could knowingly utter a false statement with the
intent to deceive. But this does not follow from the claim
that Jesus was capable of knowingly uttering a false
statement. This problem is distinct from Hopkins's criticism
that the impossibility of Jesus' willing to lie contradicts
Boso ' s claim that Jesus could lie. Even before Anselm's
Reply (on which Hopkins's criticism is based) Boso claims
that if Jesus could utter words that, when spoken in certain
circumstances, are untrue, then he was capable of telling a
lie. But that is not true, since utterance of a false
sentence (even the knowing utterance of a false sentence) is
not sufficient for the utterance of a lie. Thus the ability
to utter such words does not seem to imply the ability to
lie. It seems, rather, that willing - or at least intending
- to lie is a necessary condition for telling a lie (it is
also a condition that is, apparently not possible for
Jesus). All this is to point out that premise (3) of Boso's
Argument fails. The problem here is that the ability to lie
does not follow from the ability to utter knowingly a
statement that would be false under certain conditions (nor
does it follow from the ability knowingly to utter a false
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Statement)
. it seems that Boso must demonstrate Jesus'
capacity to intend to deceive in order to demonstrate Jesus'
capacity to lie. Thus Boso's Argument does not, in fact,
show that Jesus could sin.
In what seems to be a response to Boso's Argument,
Anselm presents a simple reply. He does not intend his reply
to show that Boso is incorrect, but simply to show that it
could be truly said of Jesus both that he was able to sin
and not able to sin. So Anselm's Reply is not intended to be
a refutation of Boso, but simply the second part of a two-
part proof of the claim that Jesus both could and could not
sin. Here is the argument:
The exercise of every personal capacity is dependent on
the will. For when I say that I can speak or walk, it
is implicitly understood that I can do these things
only if I will to do so. If willingness is not
implicitly understood in this fashion, then it is no
longer a matter of power, but rather of necessity. For
when I say that I can be unwillingly dragged or
conquered, this is not because of a power on my part,
but on account of a necessity and power which reside
with some other being. Indeed, 'I can be dragged (or
overcome)
'
just means 'Some other being can drag (or
overcome) me'. We can hence say of Christ that he could
tell a lie, provided it is implicitly understood that
he could do so only if he willed to do so. And since he
could not tell a lie without being willing to do so,
but at the same time could not be willing to do so, he
can equally be properly said to have been unable to
tell a lie. 15
Most of the first part of this passage is actually a
defense for a basic modus tollens argument. The argument
itself can be stated as follows:
15. Anselm, Cur Deus Homo
.
255-256 (see also pp. 167-168 in
Henry, The Logic of St . Anselm )
.
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Anselm's Reply :
(1) If Jesus could lie, then he could will to tell a
^ ^6 •
12 ) Jesus could not will to tell a Tip.
(3) Therefore Jesus could not lie.
^
This argument is valid (as above)
. its soundness is
based on the following defense. The first premise is a bit
tricky. Anselm's claim is this, "We can hence say of Christ
that He could tell a lie, provided it is implicitly
understood that he could do so only if he willed to do so."
The apparently obvious formulation is something like, "Jesus
could tell a lie only if he willed to tell a lie." This
sounds plausible, at first, but it seems unlikely that
Anselm meant to claim that willing to do something is a
necessary condition for the ability to do that thing. I have
the ability to throw a rock through my neighbor's window (I
could throw the rock)
,
but I do not now (and hopefully never
will) will to throw a rock through my neighbor's window. My
willingness to do that action is in no way a necessary
condition for my ability to do it. It seems more plausible
(and certainly fairer to Anselm) to understand this sentence
to mean something like, "If Jesus could lie, then he could
will to tell a lie."
Thus premise (1) simply claims that willing a lie is a
necessary condition for actually telling a lie, not for the
capacity to lie (as it might appear to one on first
reading) . Premise (2) is the simple Christological claim
that Christ could not lie, based on the standard orthodox
view of moral perfection as one of the attributes of Christ.
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It seems likely that some of the confusion about the
first premise stems from a traditional understanding of
necessity or what "must be". Such a traditional
understanding of necessity might have read something like
this: a thing is necessary if it cannot be otherwise. In
this sense of necessity the necessity of Christ's moral
goodness suggests not only the impossibility of his sinning
but also an inability to sin on his part. Anselm was not
unaware of the difficulty of ascribing the lack of certain
^^ilities to God (or to Jesus )
,
and he discussed this
subject with some care. 16 g^t if we say that it was
necessary that Christ not lie, by which we mean that he
could not do otherwise, we seem to be claiming that he was
unable to lie or to will to lie; that is, he did not even
have the capacity (some would say power) to lie (or to sin)
.
From this understanding of the necessity of Jesus' moral
goodness it seems to follow quite naturally that the only
way it could be otherwise is if Jesus did have the capacity
to will a lie. So it must be the case that he did not have
such a capacity. Thus Anselm (and others) conclude from the
notion that Jesus could not do something- in the strong
sense that he not only did not but could not will to do it-
that he did not have the capacity to do it.
It is not so clear, however, that because Christ did
not ever will to lie that it is false that he could will to
lie (that he had the capacity to will a lie) . Let us assume
16. See, for example. Cur Deus Homo . II, 17.
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that Christ was fully human and that he never married and
never engaged in an act of sexual intercourse. Let us
further assume that those are essential properties of Christ
(that may be controversial, but let us grant them for the
sake of argument)
. Let us suppose that Christ had the
capacity to father a child biologically. Yet he did not
father any children; in fact, it was not possible that he do
so, given his essential properties. But it would be wrong to
claim that there is no meaningful sense in which Jesus could
have fathered a child. Certainly there is the intuitively
challenging sense where he had the capacity but always chose
not to do so (in every possible world he does not, in fact,
father a child)
. Even though he does not ever father a
child, it does not follow that he does not have the
capacity. It seems, then, false to claim that because he did
not father a child in any possible world that he could not.
Perhaps there is a way to redo Anselm's argument that
avoids the two problems of Boso's Argument while retaining
something of Anselm's original intent. The argument that
Jesus cannot sin because he cannot will to sin seems to be
successful (granted Jesus' necessary moral goodness),
without any major problems, but it is perhaps more difficult
to establish that Jesus can sin in some meaningful way.
One intriguing possibility follows from some recent
work on the limits of the claims about what is impossible
for God. On this view it is true that God is essentially
morally good, so it is necessary that God is morally good.
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It is impossible, then, that God perform a morally wrong
act. Using standard modal semantics this means that there is
no possible world where God performs a wrong act, or sins.
The same is normally claimed of Jesus. Jesus the
Christ is essentially morally good, which means that there
is no possible world where Jesus sins. It seems, then, that
Jesus does not have the ability to sin.
The problem facing someone like Anselm who wants to
argue both for Jesus' ability to sin and his essential
goodness is what we know, today, as a difficulty associated
with possible worlds, necessity, and ability or possibility.
Anselm's Reply, as seen above, in our standard modal
semantics, rules out any possible world where Jesus sins.
The argument is simply this:
(1) Christ is necessarily morally good.
(2) If (1), then there is no possible world where
Christ sins.
(3) If there is no possible world where Christ sins,
then it is impossible that Christ commits a sin.
(4) Therefore it is impossible that Christ commits a
sin.
Any argument that Christ can sin is going to have to cope
with this one, somehow (as Hopkins points out) . It is based
on the same points as Anselm's reply, which Hopkins uses to
refute Boso's Argument.
One of Anselm's mistakes in trying to show that Christ
can sin (as mentioned above) seems to have been the attempt
to derive Christ's ability to sin from some other abilities,
such as the ability to utter a false statement or the
ability to utter a statement that, given the intent to lie.
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would be a lie. But he is unable to show, from this ability,
that Jesus ever had - or might have - the intent to lie or
sin.
But here is a curious feature of Anselm's
argumentation. He argues (as almost anyone who has ever
considered this subject does) from Jesus' divinity to the
impossibility that Jesus sin. The curious part is that he
does not then argue from Jesus' humanity to Jesus' ability
to sin. By all accounts (all orthodox accounts) Jesus was
fully human: he was born of a woman, he ate and slept
normally, he had growing pains, he walked and talked as any
of us do, and he died. Further, the traditional version of
the doctrine of the incarnation holds that Jesus had two
natures in one hypostasis or person. He had both natures
fully, however, and it is at least true about human nature
that someone who has it has the capacity to understand and
to make moral decisions. It seems true that for someone to
have human nature fully then that person must be capable of
performing (or at least have the capacity to perform) an
immoral action.
Anselm seems to have had some intuition concerning the
need to argue for Jesus' ability to sin from some aspect of
Jesus' earthly existence or human nature. That gives us the
possibility to construct an argument like the following:
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Jesus Can Sin l:
(1) Jesus was fully human.
(2) Someone^who is fully human has the capacity to sin.
ttt
—
7^
—
—
1:—
—
f ^
)
f—then Jesus had the canani-hv to sin(4) Therefore Jesus had the capacity to sin.
The traditional objection to an argument of this kind
(or even against this particular one) has been that it is
simply false that Jesus had the capacity to sin because it
was necessary that Jesus be morally good. Since it was
necessary that he be good then it was impossible that he
sin, and if it was impossible that he sin he cannot be said
to have a capacity to sin.
In a fascinating article, however, Thomas Morris has
pointed out that the claim that it is impossible that God
^oes not imply the claim that God does not have the
ability to sin.l^ Morris gives the following three
sentences:
(1) God cannot sin.
(2) It is impossible that God sin.
(3) God lacks the power to sin.
Morris takes (1) to be "a commitment of traditional
theism." He then makes the following point:
...Many... seem to understand (1), which is a
commitment of traditional theism, to be equivalent in
meaning to (3), which seems clearly to indicate that
God lacks some power ordinary human beings in fact
have. But (3) is not an accurate paraphrase of (1), nor
is it even entailed by (1). As is now well known, the
little word 'can' can serve many different functions,
and so, accordingly, 'cannot' cannot always be taken to
mean the same thing. Often, when we say something of
the form "S cannot do A", we do mean to say of some
17. Thomas V. Morris, "Perfection and Power", in Thomas V.
Morris, ed.
,
Anselmian Explorations
.
(Notre Dame, Indiana:
University of Notre Dame Press: 1987), pp. 70-75.
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individual that it lacks some power,
sort is meant when the theist uttersintended only to convey (2) , not (3) .
But nothing of the
|1). (1) is
Morris continues on here to make a point similar to the
one I intended to make above. Mine was that the claim that
it is impossible that God sin in some way does not entail
that God does not have the ability to perform a sinful act,
in the sense that God does not have that capacity. Morris's
is that there is no such thing as a
...distinct power to sin, no power the exercise of
which is, in itself, sufficient for doing evil or
sinning. And only if there were would (3), theproposition that God lacks the power to sin, followfrom (1), the proposition that God cannot sin. 19
This is especially interesting in the case of lying. We
have said that the ability to tell a lie is the ability to
knowingly utter a false statement with the intent to
deceive. Let us grant that God can utter statements (or at
least that God has some relevant analogous capacity)
. My
claim is that God does have the ability to knowingly utter a
false statement with the intent to deceive. But Anselm would
object, most likely, that such a thing cannot be, because
God is unable to have such an intent (to have such an intent
would be a sin in itself, and it is impossible that God form
evil intentions because God cannot will to sin)
.
But here we have run smack into the same problem again.
God cannot will to sin - in this case, to form the intent to
deceive - because it is impossible that God sins. But that
simply means that there is no possible world where God wills
18. Morris, in Anselmian Explorations
.
p. 72.
19. Morris, in Anselmian Explorations
.
p. 74.
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to deceive. This does not imply any lack of the capacil-y to
will to deceive; rather, it implies something like Morris's
claim, "It is necessarily the case that [God] never uses his
perfect power [in] order to sin". To the objection that the
most powerful God is one who cannot do wrong, it seems an
obvious answer that the God who has the capacity to perform
some wrong moral act and never does so has at least some
advantage, in terms of power, over the one who is unable to
do anything but the "right thing".
Morris concludes his article with a tantalizing
discussion of this claim:
(7) God could not do evil even if he intended to. 20
He suggests that this indicates "a lack of power" on God's
part "rather than a fixity or firmness of will on the part
of God" with respect to divine sinlessness. He further
suggests that we understand this claim
...as a subjunctive conditional about God with a
necessarily false antecedent which, on a standard
construal of such statements, should come out true. In
so far as theists are committed to judging it false,
they are committed to rejecting the standard semantics
which assigns it the contrary truth value. 21
But this is not exactly an accurate picture of the
semantics of such sentences. It is true that the subjunctive
conditional sentences with an impossible antecedent are
judged, by convention, to be true. So the following is true,
on this construal:
20. Morris, in Anselmian Explorations
.
p. 75.
21. Morris, in Anselmian Explorations
.
p. 75.
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(8) If God were to intend to do evil
able to do evil. '
he would not be
But the following subjunctive conditional would also be
true using the same semantic principle:
(9) If God were to intend to do evil, he would be ableto do evil.
The antecedent is impossible in this sentence, so we
must judge it to be true as well if we are to follow the
rule we used for (8). And this doesn't seem to get us
anywhere
.
It is compatible with some standard claims about God's
omnipotence (and perhaps even God's almightiness) that God
is able to do anything that God wills. It seems to be
sensible to claim that includes the ability to lie if God so
wills, or to punish Israel too harshly if God so wills, etc.
That God does not ever will such an action does nothing to
refute the claim that God could do those actions if he
willed to. Suppose we accept the thesis that there are no
possible worlds where God wills to perform an evil action.
It is impossible, then, that God so will. That does not
imply that God lacks the capacity to will an evil action.
Without such an implication it is both meaningful and
correct to argue that (9) is true and (8) is false.
We can construct a similar argument for Jesus. The goal
is to defend Jesus' ability to perform some sinful action
(in the sense of capacity to sin) while also defending the
impossibility that Jesus sin (in the sense of there being no
possible world where he performs a sinful act)
.
The argument
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that Jesus cannot sin is a simple one; Anselm has already
produced it. Here is our modern version:
Jesus Cannot sin
perform a morally wrong actionthen he can will a morally wrong action. '
(2)
It is not possible that Jesus Christ will a morallywrong action.
3) Therefore it is not possible that Jesus Christ can
3 morally wrong action.
This is a simple modus tollens argument where the
consequent of the first premise is necessarily false. It is
thus valid to conclude that the antecedent is necessarily
false. As long as we grant the assumption that Jesus,
because of his divine nature, is essentially morally good,
this argument is also sound.
Of course the matching argument is somewhat more
difficult. Here is one possibility:
Jesus Can Sin II
(1) If Jesus had the physical capacity to have sexual
intercourse, then Jesus had the capacity to commit
adultery.
(2) If Jesus had the capacity to commit adultery then
Jesus had the capacity to perform a morally wrong
action.
(3) Jesus had the physical capacity to have sexual
intercourse.
(4) Therefore Jesus had the capacity to commit a
morally wrong action.
I do not intend this argument to be shocking.
Unfortunately this particular action affords a vivid example
of something that Jesus clearly had the capacity to do,
given that he was fully human, which, in the right
circumstances, would have been a morally wrong thing to do -
a sin. Now of course the objection will be raised that.
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While Jesus could will to have sexual intercourse (as long
as there was nothing sinful about it)
,
that does not imply
that he could will to commit adultery. This resembles the
discussion above about whether the ability to utter a
sentence that, under certain conditions, is false, implies
the ability to lie. In particular it is not clear that this
argument shows anything more than that Jesus had the
physical capabilities needed for adultery. In fact, it seems
that this argument contains the same problem as Boso's
Bumble, in that it seems to suggest that we may infer from
the apparent capacity to perform a certain kind of action
the ability to will a particular performance of that action
that is immoral. This is dubious support, at best, for the
inference that Jesus could, in fact, commit a sin.
Perhaps there is a better alternative. It seems that we
need some undeniable trait (and, apparently, a necessary
one) that Jesus had in common with other humans that is
sufficient for Jesus to possess the ability to sin. But
there is such a trait.
Jesus Can Sin III
(1) If Jesus had the same human nature as Adam, then he
had the capacity to perform a morally wrong action.
(2) If Jesus had the capacity to perform a morally
wrong action, then Jesus could perform a morally wrong
action.
(3) Jesus had the same human nature as Adam.
(4) Therefore Jesus could perform a morally wrong
action.
This argument is valid. I believe its soundness is
defensible as follows. Adam did not possess or have original
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Sin. But he clearly had the capacity to sin. Anselm locates
(so to speak) this capacity in the rational will. 22 The rest
of us are tainted with original sin, but we also have the
capacity to commit our own sins. Jesus had a human rational
will that could make choices. Just as Adam could choose to
sin, so could Jesus. Jesus does not so choose, but he had
the capacity to choose to sin because he had a human,
rational will.
This argument has some distinct advantages. One of them
is that it allows for a principle of property of Jesus that
will distinguish him from Adam and explain the difference
without taking anything away from Jesus' human nature.
Otherwise he would be less than human, or not quite human,
or fully divine and not fully human: all of these
possibilities constitute one heresy or another. Another
advantage of the argument is that it does not depend on
Jesus' ability to perform some action that might, in the
right circumstances, be an immoral action. It depends rather
on a feature of Jesus' human nature to provide the capacity
to sin in some way.
Unfortunately, there is one serious problem with the
argument that Jesus has the capacity to perform a sinful act
(the same problem seems to exist for the argument that God
has such a capacity) . If we claim that Jesus has the
capacity to sin, then at any world where he chooses not to
22. Anselm of Canterbury, The Virgin Conception and Original
Sin, part III, in Eugene R. Fairweather, ed., A Scholastic
Miscellany
.
(New York: The MacMillan Company: 1970), p. 186.
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sin he could have chosen otherwise; that is, if he can
choose not to perforin a sinful action then he can choose to
perforin that action. Another way of putting this is to say
that it was possible that he perforin that action. But as
soon as we put it that way it seems clear that, at every
world where Jesus can choose between performing a sinful
action or not, there is a possible world where Jesus
performs a sinful action. That possible world is always the
one he does not choose, but there is still a possible world
in which Jesus performs a morally wrong action. Otherwise it
makes little (if any) sense to say that he "chose" not to
sin. But if there is a possible world where Jesus sins, then
it is not true that he is essentially morally good. 23
It might be claimed, in response to this, that it still
seems to follow that an omnipotent God who can do whatever
he wills can still be essentially good. The problem here is
how to evaluate such a claim. If we say that God has the
capacity to intend evil, it seems that such a capacity calls
for some possible world where it is exercised. This is the
standard view of capacity or power. So we say that God has
the capacity to intend to do evil only if he so wills. In
order to determine the truth of this claim we go to the
world where God wills to intend an evil action and see
whether he does, then, so intend. But there can be no such
world because of God's essential moral goodness. We then
23. I am indebted to Ed Gettier for suggesting some possible
implications of a claim that Jesus "chose" not to sin.
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reply, "But if there were such a world, God could do what
God wills to, there." Then, of course, we go to the closest
world where God wills to intend to do evil. But, again,
there is no such world, and if there were such a possible
world, there would then exist a possible world where God
sins
.
It is not clear how to break out of this morass, it
seems unlikely, in fact, that we can break out. What we are
left with is the tantalizing intuition on Anselm's part,
that Jesus' human nature seems to endow him with some
abilities or powers that entitle us to say that he can sin.
But the impossibility of his sinning seems to cut off every
suggestion of such possibility.
We are left, then, with no solution to the problem
mentioned at the start of the chapter. In fact, it seems
that something has to give. It may be possible to claim
something less than essential moral goodness, either for God
or Jesus or both. Or it may be that our understanding of
capacity needs to be stretched a bit, or our understanding
of necessity changed a bit, for beings such as God and
Christ. Perhaps the problem lies in our understanding of
"essential" properties. Can God have capacities, abilities,
or powers that God never exercises (at any possible world)?
Can Jesus? We are left, at least for now, with the apparent
incompatibility of Jesus' two natures. The fact of his human
nature seems to support the claim that he had the capacity
to sin, while the fact of his divine nature seems to support
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a direct refutation of such a claim. Anselm's solution to
the Temptation Problem, in the form of Boso's Argument and
Anselm's Reply, fails. This is because Boso's Argument
fails. Even Anselm's "tantalizing intuition" that something
about Jesus' human nature seems to justify the claim that he
can sin, does not, as far as I am able to tell, supply an
answer.
CHAPTER 3
ON AQUINAS'S SOLUTION
Thomas Aquinas, like Augustine and Anselm before him,
taught that Jesus was a model or moral example for
Christians. Aquinas, to cite only one passage, asserted that
Christ undertook our disabilities ... to become for us an
example of virtue".^ Aquinas was, of course, a staunch
defender of the notion that Jesus possessed two natures in
one person, or supposit . ^ As we have seen, however, these
two claims seem to present at least one potential
difficulty. We have called this difficulty the Temptation
Problem. It rests on the apparent incompatibility of divine
nature and human nature. Of particular interest is the
question of how Jesus can be "an example of virtue" for
human beings when, because of his divine nature, it was
impossible for him to sin.
Aquinas tackles this problem directly in at least three
places in the Summa Theoloqiae . He addresses, among other
issues, the questions of whether there was any sin in
1. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theoloqiae
.
volume 49, The Grace of
Christ
. 3a. 7-15, trans. with notes by Liam G. Walsh, O.P.,
(New York and London: Blackfriars, in conjunction with
McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, and Eyre & Spottiswoode
,
London, 1974); 3a. 15,1, p. 191.
2. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theoloqiae
.
volume 48, The
Incarnate Word, 3a. 1-6, trans. by R.J. Hennessey, O.P.,
(New York and London: Blackfriars, in conjunction with
McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, and Eyre & Spottiswoode,
London, 1976), p.47, 3a. 2, 3.
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Christ, whether there was the "spark" of sin in Christ, and
whether the temptation of Jesus was fitting. First I will
examine Aquinas's discussion of whether there was any sin in
Christ. This provides some useful background for the other
two subjects. The first of these, whether Jesus had a
"spark" of sin, raises some problems with Aquinas's defense
of the "two natures" view of the Incarnation. The second, on
whether Jesus' temptation was fitting, is the occasion for
serious doubts about the full humanity of Aquinas's Jesus.
In 3a. 15,1, Aquinas discusses some arguments that
purport to show that there was sin in Christ. The first
quotes Psalm 21, "0 God, my God, look upon me; Why hast thou
forsaken me? Far from my salvation are the words of my
sins," which are the words Jesus is reported to have spoken
on the cross. Aquinas dismisses this as a case where Jesus,
the head of the church, is speaking for all its members, who
were sinners.^ In the light of what is said below, we will
see that this argument might warrant more serious
consideration, but Aquinas does not treat it as serious
evidence of sin, or even the possibility thereof, in Jesus.
Aquinas does treat seriously the claim that Jesus, who
was fully human, was like every other human in that he was
descended from Adam. Aquinas presents his argument as
follows
:
Again, in Romans Paul says that "all men sinned in
Adam"; because that is, they were in him as in the one
3. Aquinas, Summa Theoloqiae . 3a. 15,1, p. 189.
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from whom they took their origin. But Christ also tookhis origin from Adam. Therefore he sinned in him.
4
In order to reply to this argument, Aquinas draws a
distinction between the way that Christ was in Adam and the
way the rest of us are in Adam, based on an earlier idea of
Augustine's. Aquinas's reply is curious, however, because of
the effort he expends to establish Christ's humanity
outside, as it were, the lineage of Adam:
As Augustine says, Christ was not in Adam or in the
other patriarchs in every way that we were. We were in
Adam both by reason of the fertilizing principle and by
reason of our bodily material. As Augustine himself
puts it, "There is in the seed of man both a visiblebodiliness and an invisible principle; and both arederived from Adam. Now Christ took the visible material
of his flesh from the flesh of the virgin; but the
principle of his conception did not come from the male
seed but from something entirely different, something
from above." (De Genesi ad Litt . X,20) Therefore,
Christ was not in Adam by reason of the fertilizing
principle, but only in his bodily material. He did not
receive human nature from Adam in an active sense, but
only in a material sense; in the active sense he
received it from the Holy Spirit- just as Adam himself
got his body materially from the dust of the earth but
actively from God. And for this reason Christ did not
sin in Adam, in whom he pre-existed only in a material
sense .
^
This seems to be a fairly neat way of answering the
problem of how Christ, who took on human nature after Adam,
avoids the "stain" of original sin. That "stain", as it is
explained in this passage, is sperm-specific. Since the
original sin was Adam's, it is passed on by Adam and all the
other fathers in history to their children. But Jesus did
not have a human father to pass on the "stain" as part of
the "fertilizing principle" the way the rest of us do; his
4. Aquinas, Summa Theoloqiae . 3a. 15,1, pp. 189-190.
5. Aquinas, Summa Theoloqiae . 3a. 15,1, p. 193.
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humanness is passed to him actively from Mary, but even then
only ••materially". The "fertilizing principle" he receives
is from the Holy Spirit much the same way that Adam receives
his body materially from dust but gets his "fertilizing
principle" from God.
Of course one question that must be addressed here is
how Jesus is different from Adam, given the explanation
above. Adam does not receive any sperm-connected principle;
like Jesus, his "fertilizing" or active principle comes from
one member of the Trinity. Augustine does not seem to see
this problem in his explanation, and Aquinas is also silent
on the subject. But it does seem that whatever property Adam
had that enabled him to sin was not passed on by "male
seed"; rather, Adam was created with that property. For
Jesus to be fully human it seems that he must have the same
property, yet it appears that he does not. Christ is,
perhaps, differentiated from the rest of humanity in this
way (that he was not brought into being as a result of '•male
seed")
,
and therefore he does not have the predisposition
that the rest of us have to sin, but he is not
differentiated from Adam by this explanation. Adam, of
course, was able to sin, but Jesus is not. Apparently Jesus'
divine nature prevents him from sinning. But that claim, as
we shall see below, has its own problems.
The next argument has to do with the claim that Jesus
was intended to be an example to those who are tempted. The
argument here is based on a text from Hebrews:
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Furthermore
,
the apostle says in Hebrews that "Christ
ab^^^to suffered and been tempted, isle help those who are tempted." (Hebrews 2 * 18 ^ Rntwe need his help above all against sin Therefor^itwould seem that sin was to be found in him.^
The argument here goes something like this. Christ is
claimed to help the rest of humanity in its temptation
because he, too, has been tempted. The same must be true of
sin. Therefore Christ must have sinned. Aquinas's response
to this seems, at first, to be a bit misguided. He claims
that Christ's temptation (as well as his suffering) is made
as a reparation for us. Now it is clear, and coherent, to
claim that Jesus suffered as a reparation for our sins. And
it is clear, or at least sensible, to claim that the person
who is to suffer for us ought to be free from guilt himself
h®^self)
. If this were not the case, then this person
would be paying for his or her own sins as well as (or
instead of) for ours. But it is not clear how Christ's
temptation could serve as a reparation for the rest of us.
Here is Aquinas's response to the argument above:
In his temptation and suffering Christ helped us by
making reparation for us. But sin does not contribute
to reparation; it rather impedes it, as has been
pointed out (3a. 14,1). And therefore he ought not to
have had any sin but rather to be entirely innocent of
it. Otherwise the punishment he suffered would have
been due to him for his own sin.^
One possible answer for Aquinas to use against the
charge that this reply is misguided is that the person
making reparation for our sins must be tempted, as we are.
6. Aquinas, Summa Theoloaiae . 3a. 15,1, p. 191.
7. Aquinas, Summa Theoloaiae . 3a. 15,1, p. 193.
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and resist the temptation, as we do not. It is only in that
case that it may be claimed that the punishment such a
person receives is not for his own sins but only for the
sins of others. Someone who is tempted but does not sin, but
who is punished as though he (or she) did sin, makes the
most thorough reparation for those of us who are tempted and
do sin. Further, such a person serves as an example to the
rest of us. Aquinas does not clearly point out, however,
that the help we receive (or even need) with temptation is
therefore different from the help we need with sin. We will
discuss this more below under the heading of temptation.
The fourth argument for the conclusion that there was
sin in Christ is a textual one based on II Corinthians:
Again, in II Corinthians (5:21) we read that, "For our
sake he [God] made him [Christ] to be sin who knew no
sin." But whatever God makes is real. Hence there was
really sin in Christ.^
Aquinas, in his response to this argument, offers a
textual "explanation" not unlike the reasoning he uses to
respond to the quotation from Psalm 21. He suggests several
readings of this text based on Biblical parallels:
God "made Christ to be sin", not by making him a sinner
but by making him a victim for sin. There is a parallel
in Hosea (4:8), where the priests are said to "feed on
the sin of the people" because according to the law
they would eat the victims offered for sin. In the same
sense we have in Isaiah (53:6), "The Lord has laid on
him the iniquity of us all", meaning that he gave him
up to be a victim for the sins of all men. Or "made him
to be sin" could mean "in the likeness of sinful
flesh", as in Romans (8:3). And this would be because
of the vulnerable and mortal body which he took on.
8. Aquinas, Summa Theoloaiae . 3a. 15,1, p. 191.
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These are really arguments that seem intended to
explain away a challenging or undesirable interpretation of
sacred texts, so I will not deal with them here. It does
seem, however, that both the guotation from Psalm 21 and
this quotation from II Corinthians have a possible reading
in which they claim that Jesus had the same condition of sin
or sinfulness or, perhaps, the possibility of sinning that
the rest of us have. This is at once an obvious reading of
those texts and also the most difficult to accept, in the
sense that this reading requires a severely different
understanding of Christ from the one Aquinas appears to be
arguing for here.
The final argument that Aquinas presents in favor of
the claim that there was sin in Christ is the following:
Finally, Augustine says, "In the man Christ the Son of
God offered to us as an example" (De Agone Christiano
II.) • But man needs an example not alone of how to live
well but also of how to repent of his sins. Therefore
it would seem that there should have been sin in Christ
so that, by repenting of his sins, he could give us an
example of repentance.^
Aquinas's statement of this claim is curious, to the
point where one might reasonably accuse him of setting up a
"straw person". The quotation from Augustine seems
noncommittal concerning just how it is that Christ is to be
an example to us, although we might reasonably assume him to
mean that Christ should serve as a sort of moral exemplar to
us. Of course someone who is without sin will not be a good
example for those of us who need to repent our sin. But
9. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae , 3a. 15,1, p. 191.
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Aquinas puts his "opponent" in the position of arguing for
the importance
- perhaps even the primary importance - of an
example of "how to repent of (our) sins". And it seems
plausible to claim that someone who is a good example of how
to repent of our sins must have sins of his or her own to
repent. Aquinas's response to this argument is this:
A penitent can give praiseworthy example, not because
he sinned but because he willingly bears punishment for
sin. Hence Christ gave the supreme example of penitents
by willingly undertaking punishment, not for his own
sins but for the sins of others. 10
One potential problem with this counter-argument is
that it does not seem accurate to call Christ a penitent. It
seems that a penitent is one who is doing penance. Normally
one does penance for one's own sins. Aquinas stretches this
to include penance done on behalf of someone else, so it
does seem that Christ can set an example for penitents. But
this does not really provide an adequate account of what it
means to repent of one's sin or sins. The Hebrew root of the
Old Testament term for repentance, shuv
,
is probably best
translated as "to turn away from" with an underlying
connotation of "turning away from one thing toward another".
To repent of one's sins, then, is best understood as to turn
away from them toward goodness and righteousness. Certainly
to do that one must have sinned to begin with, and real
repentance will involve rejecting one's own sin as well as
accepting punishment for the sin. In fact, it is certainly
possible to "willingly undertake punishment" for sin without
10. Aquinas, Summa Theoloqiae . 3a. 15,1, pp. 193-4.
64
turning from the sin at all. One might commit the sin of
theft, for example, get caught, and willingly serve the
prison term (and whatever religious sanction is imposed)
while simply waiting out the sentence to enjoy the fruits of
the crime (or plan to do it again, only better)
. Thus
although Christ could serve as an example of willingly
undertaking punishment, he could not exemplify full
repentance in the sense I have just described, since he did
not have any sin to turn away from.
Although this section of the Summa does not seem
entirely satisfactory as proof that Christ did not sin (or
have sin in him, I do not believe that anything I have said
here proves that he did. I do believe, however, that two
serious questions for Aquinas's claims here have been
raised. The first is the problem of Jesus' similarity to
Adam with regard to his "fertilizing principle" and the
effect that has on his ability to sin (and thus to be
tempted to sin) . The second is the problem, just discussed,
of Jesus' completeness as a model of repentance, given his
sinlessness. I will combine these points with some others,
below, to make a case against the full humanity of Aquinas's
Christ. The question of Christ as an example of how to
overcome temptation will be addressed below. The next
problem Aquinas takes up is whether, given that there is no
sin in Christ, there is the "spark of sin" in Christ.
"Spark of sin" as it is used by Aquinas, seems to imply
some readiness, tendency, or capacity for inordinate desire
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or uncontrolled passions. Aquinas argues that there is no
spark of sin in Christ. He suggests that there is a
"tendency towards sin which is implied in the phrase 'spark
of sin'".H He takes up the following as a first argument
for the existence of this "spark" in Christ:
It seems there was some spark of sin in Christ. The
spark of sin comes from the same source as does the
vulnerability of the body, or mortality; it comes from
the removal of original justice by which, at once, the
lower powers of the soul had been kept subject to
reason and the body to the soul. But Christ was
vulnerable and mortal. Therefore he also had the spark
of sin. 12
Roughly, the argument here seems to be that if Christ has
the "vulnerability of the body", then he has the spark of
sin that comes from that vulnerability (this is because of
the removal of original justice, which affects the power of
reason over the soul, which in turn controls the body)
.
Since he has that vulnerability, then he must have the spark
of sin. But of course one way out of this problem is built
into Aquinas's presentation of the "source" of mortality:
the removal of original justice. That is what happened by
Adam's action, and we have already seen Aquinas's claim that
Christ is free of Adam's "stain". But Aquinas's answer is a
bit surprising:
The lower powers belonging to the sense appetite are,
by nature, meant to obey reason. But this is not true
of the physical powers, either of the body's metabolism
or of the vegetative soul, as is clear from I Ethics
(13 . 1102b28) . And therefore perfect virtue, which
follows right reason, does not exclude vulnerability
from the body; but it does exclude the spark of sin.
11. Aquinas, Summa Theoloaiae . 3a. 15, 2, p. 195.
12. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae , 3a. 15, 2, p. 195.
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the very idea of which involves resistance by the sense
appetite to reason.
This response points out an interesting feature of
Aquinas's view of the incarnate Christ. He is willing to
grant that Christ is vulnerable and mortal (anyone who
believes in the atonement must, of course)
. But Christ is
not without original justice; in fact, Christ is in the same
condition with respect to original justice that Adam was
the fall. The rest of us seem to have the spark of
sin because we are descended from Adam in a way that Christ
is not (see above). But Aquinas's point here is that virtue,
even "perfect" virtue, does not control the body to the
point of excluding its vulnerability to decay and mortality.
Such virtue - especially perfect virtue - does create the
possibility of controlling the spark of sin, where the body,
so to speak, resists the rule of reason.
But there is some confusion here between the spark of
sin as the absence of original justice and the spark of sin
as concupiscence itself. This shows up a bit more clearly in
the next argument:
Again, Damascene says, "By the loving-kindness of God
the body of Christ was allowed to do and to suffer
whatever the flesh is heir to." (^ Fide Orth
.
.
Ill,
19) But the flesh naturally lusts after the things that
give it pleasure. Since, however, the spark of sin is
really concupiscence, according to [Lombard's] Gloss
(VI, 16 (Romans 7:8)), it would seem that Christ had
the spark of sin.^'^
One of the primary qualities of the body is concupiscence
(lust after pleasure). Since Christ has all the qualities of
13. Aquinas, Summa Theoloaiae . 3a. 15,2, p. 197.
14. Aquinas, Summa Theoloqiae . 3a. 15,2, p. 195.
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the body, then Christ was subject to concupiscence. Since
concupiscence is really the spark of sin, then Christ had
the spark of sin. Aquinas's response is as follows:
The flesh naturally lusts after what gives it pleasure,through desire residing in the sense appetite. But the^flesh of man, who is a rational animal, desires these
things according to the manner and measure of reason.
And in this way the flesh of Christ, through the
longing of the sense appetite, naturally desired food
and drink and sleep and other such things as may
reasonably be desired- a point made by Damascene (De
Fide Orth. Ill, 14) . But it does not follow from this
that Christ had the spark of sin; for that implies a
longing for what gives pleasure without any reference
to reason.
But this response seems to be based on an equivocation
on "longing". 16 He claims, at first, that the flesh of
Christ "naturally lusts" or desires (or longs for) what
gives it pleasure, within the confines of reason. That is
concupiscence; the emotion or passion of desiring what is
simply good. The flesh of an animal with a rational soul is
naturally concupiscent. Before the fall, the human situation
of original justice kept the reason in charge of the balance
or control of the passions (including concupiscence). Thus
the passions were not absent; they were simply under
appropriate control. But Aquinas then denies that Christ had
any such longing: to claim that Christ had the spark of sin
would be to say that he had "a longing for what gives
pleasure without any reference to reason".
But that is precisely the longing that any being with a
sense appetite has. And this includes the incarnate Christ.
15. Aquinas, Summa Theoloqiae , 3a. 15, 2, p. 197.
16. I am indebted to Gary Matthews for suggesting this.
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The equivocation results from claiming that Christ had "the
longing of the sense appetite" but did not have a "longing
for what gives pleasure without reference to reason". The
longing of the sense appetite is a longing without reference
to reason, as well. It is simply the case in rational
animals that reason exercises some control over those
longings. Suppose that I am dreadfully thirsty and I see a
pool of water. Next to the pool is a sign that says "Do Not
Drink: Poison". I am capable of refraining from drinking the
water because of the capacity of reason that I have in
virtue of being a rational animal. An animal without reason
lacks any such capacity. Neither reason itself nor the
original justice, were I to have it, would prevent my sense
appetite from desiring water. It is unclear, I think,
whether my reason could prevent my sense appetite from
desiring the water in the pool, knowing that it is poison.
Certainly my reason may prevent me from acting on my desire
for water (or even for that water) . It also seems clear,
however, that it is incorrect to hold that Christ, in his
human existence, lacked the longings of sense appetite.
It seems to make more sense for Aquinas to refute the
argument above by denying that the spark of sin is
concupiscence. Aquinas seems to use the "spark" metaphor in
its traditional sense of "capacity or ability for
'irrational emotions'" or in the case of concupiscence,
inordinate desires.!^ Concupiscence itself is not properly
17. See Aquinas, Summa Theoloaiae . Ia2ae. 74,4 (v. 25,
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thought of as the spark of sin, on this view, but rather as
the kindling in which the spark can catch fire. The spark
seems to be located in the will (which is where sin takes
place); it is, perhaps, the failure of reason to control the
desires of the sense appetite.
Following this line of reasoning, we can claim that
Christ had the normal human sensual desires that "the flesh
is heir to". But Christ has not lost original justice, as
all the descendants of Adam have, so there is in him no
spark of sin; that is, there is no apparent capacity for
inordinate desires.
But it is wrong to imagine here that the issue is
settled. For it is also the case that while Adam did not
lack original justice, he was nonetheless capable of
sinning. The third argument about whether the spark of sin
was in Christ suggests that Adam lacked some strength of
spirit that Christ had. Here is the argument in favor:
Moreover, because of the spark of sin "the flesh lusts
again in the spirit," as we read in Galatians (5:17).
But the spirit proves itself stronger and more worthy
of its crown the more it conguers its enemy, the lusts
of the flesh. This is the sense of "An athlete is not
crowned unless he competes according to the rules", in
II Timothy (2:5). But Christ had the strong and all-
conquering spirit, the one most worthy of a crown,
according to Revelation, "and a crown was given to him,
and he went out conquering and to conquer" (6:2). It
would seem, then, that Christ, above anybody else,
ought to have had the spark of sin.^®
We can formulate an argument from this passage along the
lines of the following:
p. 103) .
18. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 3a. 15, 2, p. 195.
70
(1) Christ had the strongest spirit: the one "worthy of
a crown"
.
^
(2) If (1) , then Christ battled and conquered the
enemy
.
(3) If Christ battled and conquered the enemy, thenChrist had the spark of sin.
(4) Therefore Christ had the spark of sin.
Aquinas answers this by granting (1) but claiming
something quite different for the "strongest" spirit:
The strength of the spirit is shown to some extent when
it fights against the lusts of the flesh that opposes
it. But it is shown to a far greater extent if, by its
power, the flesh is entirely overcome, so that it can
no longer lust against the spirit. And this was the
case with Christ, whose spirit reached the highest
degree of strength. Furthermore, although he did not
have to cope with the attacks from within due to the
spark of sin, he did undergo attack from outside, both
from the world and the devil. In conquering these he
merited the crown victory.
Aquinas seems to intend that the following sentence
rejects premise (2) of the argument above:
But it (the strength of the spirit) is shown to a far
greater extent if, by its power, the flesh is entirely
overcome, so that it can no longer lust against the
spirit. 20
This seems to suggest that it is false to claim that "the
spirit proves itself stronger and more worthy of the crown
the more it conquers its enemy, the lusts of the flesh",
which is the basis for premise (2)
.
Rather, according to
Aquinas, there is a greater power of spirit that is so
strong that it prevents lust against the spirit from even
occurring.
It seems, however, that there are two possible readings
of the sentence just quoted above. Neither of them achieves
19. Aquinas, Summa Theoloqiae . 3a. 15,2, p. 197.
20. Aquinas, Summa Theoloqiae . 3a. 15, 2, p. 197.
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the result Aquinas desires. The first reading is something
like this: the strongest spirit is so powerful that the
flesh cannot - is not able to - lust against it. Thus the
battle, so to speak, is never joined, because the outcome is
clear in advance.
But here is a problem with this reading. Either the
"flesh” of some human individual can lust or it cannot. By
lust" here I think Aquinas means the simple desire of the
sense appetites for pleasures (not sinful lust) . So either
the flesh can long for food, sleep, etc., or it cannot. If
it can, then it is incorrect to claim that even the
strongest spirit can somehow prevent this ability. But in
any case where the spirit is so strong that the flesh lacks
the ability to lust or long for various goods, then the
humanity of that individual is questionable, at best.
Whatever human nature is, in earthly form it certainly
includes that ability of the flesh to lust, in the sense
that the sense appetite longs for goods.
The second reading of the sentence above is this: after
the conflict between the lust of the flesh and the spirit,
the flesh is overcome so that it can no longer lust against
the spirit. But, following this reading, the flesh has, at
least for a time, the ability to lust. In that case a real,
inward conflict does exist, so it is incorrect to conclude
that Christ did not have to "cope with attacks from within"
due to the spark of sin or something else (perhaps simple
concupiscence) . This reading is somewhat more dubious
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(according to my Latin translator, it has little basis in
the text) and, in any case, it certainly does not seem to
help Aquinas reach his conclusion. It may be that the same
treatment of the "spark of sin" used above may help Aquinas
out of this jam, but he does not make use of it here. Given
that the first reading is the one Aquinas would prefer, it
seems that he has not explained how a person with a full
human nature, fully incarnated, can fail to have the ability
to long for simple sensual goods.
The final argument of interest here concerns the
fittingness of Jesus' temptation. Here we want to focus on
two parts of Aquinas's text. First we shall note Aquinas's
third justification for the fittingness of the temptation of
Christ:
Thirdly, [Christ was tempted] in order to give us an
example: to teach us, namely, how to overcome the
temptations of the devil. For this reason Augustine
says that Christ "allowed himself to be tempted" by the
devil, "so that, in overcoming these temptations, he
might be our Mediator, not only as one who helps us,
but also as one who gives us the example". ( De
Trinitatae IV, 13, 17)21
Only the third argument for the conclusion that it was
not fitting that Christ be tempted is of immediate concern
to us:
Furthermore, temptation is threefold: of the flesh, the
world, and the devil. But Christ was not tempted by the
21. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theoloaiae . vol. 53, 3a. 38-45,
trans. by R.J. Hennessey, O.P., (New York and London:
Blackfriars, in conjunction with McGraw-Hill Book Company,
New York, and Eyre & Spottiswoode, London, 1976); 3a. 41,1,
p. 73
.
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flesh or the world. Therefore neither should he havebeen tempted by the devil. 22
This does not seem to be a terrific argument against the
possibility or the fittingness of Christ's temptation. It is
really not an argument at all, but rather a kind of
assertion against the claim that it was fitting for Christ
to be tempted. But what is of real interest here is
Aquinas ' s reply
:
As the Apostle says, Christ wished to be "tempted in
every way, without sin" (Hebrews 4:15). Now temptation
which comes by way of an enemy can be without sin,
because it comes about by mere outward suggestion. But
temptation which comes by way of the flesh cannot be
without sin, because a temptation is brought about by
pleasure and concupiscence; and, as Augustine says
"there is some sin whenever 'the desire of the flesh
opposes the spirit' "
(
City of God, XIX, 4), and so
Christ wished to be tempted by an enemy, but not by the
flesh . 23
There are two problems with this set of claims. The
first is a textual one. Aquinas reads "he was tempted in
every way as we are, without sin" to mean that Christ was
tempted only in those situations (such as the devil offering
him dominion over the world) where the "attack" is from
without. Since Christ was without sin (or its spark) it was
not possible that he suffer the temptations that are from
within (and, as such, sinful) . The problem here is that this
is a unique way of reading this text. Most English
translators render this passage as something like "Jesus was
tempted in every way that we are, yet he did not sin."
Certainly Aquinas's use of his translation opens him to the
22. Aquinas, Summa Theoloqiae . 3a. 41,1, p. 71.
23. Aquinas, Summa Theoloqiae , 3a. 41,1, p. 75.
charge of using that translation most convenient to his
interpretation
.
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The other problem has to do with two of the claims
about temptation. The first is the claim that Christ's
temptation as an example for us:
[Christ was tempted] in order to give us an example: to
teach us, namely, how to overcome the temptation of the
devil. 24
The second is that Christ "did not have to cope with attacks
from within due to the spark of sin". If we follow Aguinas's
version of the passage from Hebrews, Jesus' incarnation
gives us an example for only one kind of temptation. Jesus
was immune to the temptation of the flesh (see above)
,
but
we are not.
Here is the problem. It seems, on this view, that
Christ is a poor example for us. While he is a good example
for temptations from without, he is not an example at all
for "attacks from within". And yet that is the kind of
"attack" we are perhaps most subject to. It may even be that
temptations from the devil or the world would have no
effectiveness were it not for the inward susceptibility of
our spirits. But that does not make much difference for this
problem: Christ is simply not an example to us for "attacks
from within". Aquinas is committed to this, however, because
if Christ were to be an example to us for "attacks from
within" he would fall prey to Augustine's "problem". That is
the problem that "temptation which comes by way of the flesh
24. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae , 3a. 41,1, p. 73.
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cannot be without sin". So we are left with either a poor
example or else a sinful one, but in neither case a good
one
.
There is another, related problem. Adam was created
with "original justice": roughly, the state of grace before
original sin, in which one is both morally and emotionally
stable, as well as being endowed with various physical gifts
such as immortality
.
25 bereft of original justice
because of the sin of Adam. The lack of original justice
results in the inability of our reason properly to control
our lusts, etc. This, of course, is one reason or
explanation for the inevitability of our own sin, but that
is another matter. Christ is born as a human baby with
original justice, however, because his paternal
("fertilizing") principle is not from a human father, but
from a divine Father (following this view, it is tempting to
say that Aquinas thought that sin was sperm-specific) . But
Adam was created with original justice. He was also created,
more importantly, with the capacity to lose his original
justice; that is, Adam had the capacity to sin. We might say
that Adam was able to will or to intend to sin. But Jesus
had no such capacity. He could not will, or intend, to sin.
This inability is due to his divine nature.
Aquinas has, of course, at least one line of defense
against this point. He can claim that Jesus had the same
25. Aquinas, Summa Theoloqiae . vol. 49, translator's
glossary, p. 224.
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capacity to sin that Adam had. The difference is that, for
Jesus, his divine nature was so strong that it simply
overrode, as it were, the capacity to sin so that, in
practice, it was impossible for Jesus to sin. We might
understand the passage quoted above, about the strength of
Jesus' spirit, to express this claim. This strength, Aquinas
might argue, is so great that "the flesh is entirely
overcome, so that it can no longer lust against the spirit".
But this suggests the same problem that was mentioned
above. If the flesh of some person cannot long for food,
sleep, etc., then the person who lacks this ability is
questionably human. If the overcoming of the longing of the
flesh takes place during Jesus' lifetime, then there was a
time when Jesus had the "inner battle" between the flesh and
the spirit that Aquinas denies. In any case, Aquinas's Jesus
lacks the ability to lose his original justice while Adam
clearly had the ability. At best, the inability to sin makes
Jesus a poor model or example for those of us who not only
can sin but will. At worst, it is precisely the ability to
lose his original justice that marks Adam as truly and fully
human while Jesus was not; Jesus, in Adam's place, could not
have committed the sin which stained the rest of us. Since
we cannot have his strength of spirit (none of us is
divine), it seems that Aquinas's Jesus fails as a moral
model or example.
Thus it seems, finally, that Aquinas has failed to
solve the Temptation Problem. Apparently it is not the case
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that Christ is tempted in every way as we are, yet without
sin. The view of Christ he gives us is, finally, one in
which Christ, while fully divine, is not fully human.
CHAPTER 4
ON STURCH'S SOLUTION
Although there has been only a limited amount of
discussion of what I have called the Temptation Problem
among modern philosophers, what discussion there has been
seems interesting. In this chapter I discuss two versions of
the problem of whether it was possible for Jesus to sin, as
they are considered by R.L. Sturch in an article in
Religious Studies . ^ Sturch 's foil, for his first argument,
is C.B. Martin's assertion, in his book Religious Belief
.
that there is a basic contradiction in the doctrine of the
Incarnation as it has been traditionally taught and
understood. Martin's claim is this:
The contradiction is that Christ can be conceived to
have been other (that is, not good) than he was, yet as
God it should be not just false but inconceivable that
he should have been not good.^
There is some confusion about exactly what Martin means
by this claim. Much of the confusion focuses on his use of
the term "conceive". Martin seems to mean something like
this. Jesus was human. He was born of a human mother, lived
an apparently normal human childhood, and grew to adulthood
in the same fashion as other Jewish youths of his time. When
we think of this "historical Jesus", it is easy to imagine
1. R.L. Sturch, "God, Christ, and Possibilities", Religious
Studies
.
no. 16, (March 1980), pp. 81-84.
2. C.B. Martin, Religious Belief . (Ithaca, NY; Cornell
University Press, 1959), p. 62.
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or conceive that the individual we normally call Jesus, who
was a carpenter and a carpenter's son about two thousand
years ago in Galilee, could have done something morally
wrong. We can conceive, for example, that he lied to his
mother, or lusted in some morally incorrect way after Mary
Magdalene, or some such thing. Sometimes a valuable
distinction is made between Jesus, the historical figure,
and Christ, the role of sinless Messiah that Jesus is
reported to have filled. Martin seems to claim that, even
when we think of Jesus as the person occupying the role
"Christ", we can still conceive or imagine that he did
something morally wrong; that is, even granting that Jesus
as the Christ was sinless, we can nonetheless conceive that
Jesus could have done something morally wrong. In that case
we can conceive that he "could have been other than he was".
But the Christ is claimed, in the traditional teachings of
Christianity, to have had a divine nature; that is, he was
part (one person) of the triune God of many of the earliest
Christian creeds.
This God is normally claimed to have a variety of
divine attributes, such as omnipotence, omniscience, and
perfect moral goodness. Traditionally this last attribute
has been understood to mean that, at the least, God is
necessarily morally good. A being who is necessarily morally
good cannot possibly sin or perform an act that is morally
wrong. According to Martin, someone who properly understands
the term "God" cannot then use it to refer to any entity who
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IS not morally perfect. "God" is a name that refers to the
being who is morally perfect, so it makes no more sense to
say that it is conceivable that God could do something
morally wrong than it does to say that someone is both a
bachelor, properly understood, and, at the same time,
married. The person who is the Christ is also God, with a
fully divine nature, and therefore possessing the divine
attributes mentioned above (as well as a number of others,
of course)
. Thus Martin concludes that it is inconceivable
that Christ, since he was God, could have been other than
morally perfect. Martin's case here seems to boil down to
the claim that the following two sentences are
contradictory
:
(1) One can conceive the idea that Christ was able to
do wrong (for example, to commit adultery with Martha).
(2) One cannot conceive the idea that Christ was able
to do wrong.
It is important to keep in mind the notion that
"Christ" refers to the person, also named Jesus of Nazareth,
who has both a human and a divine nature. Critics of
Martin's work claim that there is no contradiction at all
between the claim that Christ can be conceived to have done
something morally wrong and the claim that Christ (properly
understood as a being for whom it is impossible to do
something morally wrong) cannot be conceived to have done
something morally wrong. We may call this the Conceivability
Objection. It seems to center on the notion that someone may
be able to conceive certain states of affairs that are not
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logically possible. It may be, for example, that time travel
is not logically possible. Let's suppose that it is the case
that time travel is logically impossible. But certainly it
seems that many of us can conceive of time travel. It seems,
then, that it need not be contradictory to claim that "time
travel is logically impossible" and "time travel is
conceivable". This seems like a reasonable objection, but it
is possible for us to understand Sturch's complaint against
Martin without developing it further here. I will come back
to this point below.
R.L. Sturch rejects Martin's position. In his article
"God, Christ, and Possibilities"^
,
Sturch attempts to refute
Martin's claim by distinguishing between two types of
"possibility-statement". The first, which he calls "strict
logical possibility", is used to refer to those states of
affairs that are not logically impossible. The second type
is what Sturch calls "statements of relative possibility",
which he describes as statements in which
the possibility is relative to the speaker's existing
knowledge, or at least to that part of his knowledge on
which he is drawing at the time of speaking.^
Examples of such statements are "I may possibly be
going away next weekend" and "It is possible that we left
the stove on". It is logically impossible, for example, that
I be in both Boston and Los Angeles at ten o'clock in the
morning. Eastern Standard Time, next Friday. So I might
3. Sturch, "God, Christ, and Possibilities", pp. 81-84.
4. Sturch, "God, Christ, and Possibilities", p. 81.
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claim truly, using the first type of possibility statement,
that "It is not possible that I be in both Boston and Los
Angeles at ten in the morning. Eastern Standard Time, next
Friday." An example of the second sort of possibility
statement would be, "It is possible that I will be in Boston
next Friday at 10 in the morning. Eastern Standard Time." As
far as I know now, that is, or at least as far as I am
currently drawing on my knowledge, I can be in Boston next
Friday at ten am EST. One interesting feature of Sturch's
view is that this statement seems to be true even if, for
example, I know that I am going to be in New York next
Friday, but I do not at the time of speaking remember that.
Sturch's objection to Martin goes something like this.
Sturch says that Martin claims that there is a contradiction
between these two propositions:
(i) It was possible that Christ should not be good.
(ii) It was not possible that Christ should not be
good
.
Sturch, of course, replies to Martin by claiming that
(i) and (ii) can be read in such a way that they are not
contradictory. This is because, he suggests, we can have
available to us different pieces of information or evidence
at different times. This information or evidence affects the
meaning of "possible" in each statement. Both statements,
then, can be true at the same time. We can truly assert the
first statement, "given as our evidence that Christ was
human", while of course it is not true given the information
that Christ was divine. At the same time, given the
information that Christ was divine, (ii) is also true.
Therefore there is no contradiction.
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Sturch, then, seems to think we must equivocate on the
meaning of "possibility" in order to truthfully assert (i)
and (ii). In particular, he suggests that we may be
ambiguous in our use of the term "possible". In the first
instance we use "possible" to mean something like
"epistemically possible", while in the second we use
"possible" to mean something like "strictly logically
possible". His claim, then, amounts to saying that two
apparently contradictory sentences about possibility, such
as (i) and (ii) above, need not be contradictory at all,
provided that one sentence can be understood in terms of
logical possibility and the other in terms of epistemic
possibility. It actually seems that he claims that so long
as the two sentences can be understood in two different
contexts of the memory or knowledge of the speaker, then
they are not contradictory. Take, for another example, the
following two sentences.
(iii) It is possible that this essay was composed on a
computer
.
(iv) It is not possible that this essay was composed on
a computer
.
Sturch would claim that these sentences can be
understood in such a way that they are not contradictory.
According to Sturch, as long as I am drawing on two
different "parts" of my knowledge when I utter these
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sentences, they are both true. Suppose that at one moment I
recall the process of sitting at my keyboard, composing this
essay, and I utter (iii). At that moment, (iii) expresses
something true. A moment later, distracted in some way or
simply blocking out the appropriate part of my memory, as
well as any knowledge I have of computers and their use
(particularly by me), I utter (iv). At that second moment,
according to Sturch, (iv) is true; that is, it expresses a
possibility relative to that part of the speaker's knowledge
on which he is drawing at the time of speaking.
This is actually a more plausible position than it
seems at first glance. We usually say that two sentences are
contradictory when they are formal contradictories. But what
Sturch has done here is to propose that we equivocate on the
term "possibility". In sentence (iii), the possibility
expressed might be strictly logical possibility. In sentence
(iv), however, the possibility expressed might be epistemic
possibility. It may be more accurate to describe this
possibility as "current epistemic possibility"; that is,
possibility relative to the knowledge one draws on at the
moment. Thus someone who does not know where Los Angeles and
Boston are located, might say truly that "It is possible
that Tom will be in both Boston and Los Angeles at ten am
EST next Friday." It is epistemically possible, to the
speaker, that I may be in both those places at the same time
next Friday. But of course it not strictly logically
possible, especially when one considers what we mean by
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"Boston" and "Los Angeles". We must beware, however, that
the knowledge, or lack thereof, of the speaker of any
sentence is not sufficient to change or establish the
strictly logical possibility of some state of affairs
described by that sentence. Someone might claim, in
response, that some state of affairs obtains "for all l
know" unless it is strictly logically possible that state of
obtains. But this does not seem to be the case.
Surely there are states of affairs about which I have no
knowledge that are, in fact, strictly logically impossible.
But I can nonetheless truly claim about those states of
that, for all 1 know, they are possible.
Sturch's claim, then, is that (iii) and (iv) are both
true, provided that we understand "possible" to mean one
thing in (iii) and another thing in (iv) . He makes the same
claim, as well, for (i) and (ii), in response to Martin's
position that (i) and (ii) are contradictory. But this seems
at best confusing, and it actually may be misleading. It is
misleading, it seems, to claim that (i) and (ii) are not
contradictory unless he makes explicit the qualification
that we must understand (i) to be a claim about "relative"
(epistemic) possibility and (ii) to be a claim about
strictly logical possibility. Where Sturch is misleading can
be found in his explanation that "possibility is normally
relative" to some "given" or other; should the "given"
element change, the possibility changes. But what changes is
not the actual state of affairs with respect to its
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possibility. What changes, rather, is the sense of "is
possible" that appears in each claim, respectively. He gives
three examples:
Now, as we have noticed, possibility is normally
relative; a state of affairs cannot, except in the
sense of strict logical possibility, be possible inItself, but only given some other state of affairs.
And if the 'given' element changes, the possibility ofthat first state of affairs changes, too. Given as ourbackground knowledge or evidence that Dickie is an
animal, it is possible that he is a bird; given that
he is a human being, it is quite impossible. Yet being
an animal and being a human are in no way
incompatible. Similarly, given as our evidence that
Christ was human, the assertion 'Christ could have
sinned (even if in fact he never did)' is a possible
one; given that he was divine, it is not. And there is
no contradiction. Indeed, very much the same situation
can arise with others besides Christ. Given 'Jane is
human' it is possible that Jane is a sinner; given
that Jane is only two hours old, it is not. Yet being
two hours old does not preclude being human.
^
On a generous reading, Sturch's claim here actually
seems to amount to this: two apparently contradictory
sentences about Christ (or about Dickie or Jane) are not
contradictory, provided that we read them in such a way that
they do not contradict each other. But it is not entirely
clear that this generous reading is justified. At the
beginning of this passage, Sturch proposes this view:
Now, as we have noticed, possibility is normally
relative; a state of affairs cannot, except in the
sense of strict logical possibility, be possible in
itself, but only given some other state of affairs. And
if the 'given' element changes, the possibility of that
first state of affairs changes, too.
The last sentence is key. On the generous reading, what
Sturch is saying here is something like, "...if the 'given'
5. Sturch, "God, Christ, and Possibilities", p. 82.
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element changes, the epistemic possibility of that first
state of affairs changes." But it seems more or less
equally plausible to read this phrase as a claim about the
changing nature of the strictly logical possibility that is
a property of some state of affairs. In the case of a
necessary property or state of affairs, such a claim is, at
quite unclear. If some property X is a necessary
property of some property-holder A, that means that it is
not possible for A to obtain while X does not. The
possibility of X is relative to A's existence, but not to
anyone's knowledge of A's existence. The reason that (i) and
(ii) are properly claimed to be contradictory is they are
formal contradictories. At the least, it seems, Sturch is
sloppy enough about his own use of "relative" possibility to
mislead us into thinking that he is making a more serious
claim; he almost echoes Boso (see Chapter 2) in sounding as
though he is claiming that it is both possible and not
possible for Christ to commit a sin. And, of course, he is
claiming that, but only in the limited way of saying that
two different kinds of possibility are at work in those
claims
.
One further clarification of Sturch 's move may help:
Sturch has really turned the apparently contradictory claims
about Jesus into conditional sentences. For example:
(1) If all we know about Dickie is that he is an
animal, then it is possible that he is a bird.
(2) If all we know about Dickie is that he is a human
being, then it is not possible that he is a bird.
88
These sentences are not contradictory, of course.
Sturch seems to maintain that this use of conditional
sentences is really the way to express the claims about
Christ:
(3) If all that we know about Christ is that he was
human, then it is possible that he sinned.
(4) If all we know about Christ is that he was divine,
then it is not possible that he sinned.
These two sentences are not contradictory, either. They
do not, however, correctly express the claims made about the
possibility of Christ sinning. The claim that Christ was
tempted in every way as we are is a stronger claim than the
claim that if Christ was human, then it was possible that he
should do wrong. The first claim, that Christ was tempted in
every way that we are, means more or less that Christ was
enticed or allured to do something that was unwise or
immoral with the anticipation or promise of gain, reward, or
pleasure. This implies that it was possible for him to be so
enticed (it entails that he was so enticed). The second
claim, that if Christ was human then it was possible for him
to sin, is simply a conditional claim that is limited in a
hidden way even beyond its conditionality. Suppose it is
true that Christ was human (he had a full human nature)
.
Sturch 's reading of the sentence, "It is possible that
Christ should do something wrong," is actually, "It is
possible, for all we know, that Christ should do something
wrong." Above, however, I have suggested that there are
states of affairs that are logically impossible but about
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Which we (or at least I) have little or no knowledge. My
lack of knowledge would never make it the case that those
states of affairs are, then logically possible. Again, this
is where Sturch's reading seems misleading.
We may want to propose a way out of this difficulty by
pointing out that Martin might have been a bit clearer. Let
us suppose that some state of affairs is "logically
possible" when there is some possible world where that state
of affairs obtains. That state of affairs (or any state of
affairs) is logically impossible when there is no possible
world where that state of affairs obtains. Thus a state of
that is logically impossible cannot be logically
possible, and vice versa . Martin might have made his case
stronger (or at least clearer) if he had said that the
following two sentences are contradictory:
(i*) It was logically possible that Christ should not
be good.
(ii*) It was logically impossible that Christ should
not be good.
Of course it is still true that someone could believe
that (i*) is true when, in fact, it is false. Such a person
might not know that (ii*) is true. But this way of stating
the problem seems to eliminate the problem of eguivocating
on "possibility". If (i*) is true, then (ii*) is clearly
false, and vice versa . This better states what Martin meant,
I believe, and Sturch's distinction will not support the
claim that these two sentences are not contradictory.
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Sturch takes up a second problem, one that he
attributes to Peter Geach, in which the problem of the
impossibility of God's actually having certain qualities
that Jesus possessed is raised. 6 sturch 's discussion in this
case starts with the logic of reduplicative propositions, in
particular ones such as "Christ, as God could not be tired "
or Christ, as human could possibly sin", etc. Reduplicative
propositions, loosely speaking, are propositions in which
some quality or part of the subject is restated,
highlighted, or repeated, usually in the form, "X, as Y,
etc." Geach considers something like the following two
propositions
:
(1) Christ, as God, could not possibly sin.
(2) Christ, as human, could possibly sin.
The problem, as Sturch frames it, is this: unlike the
possibility of Jesus committing a sin, Jesus "actually was
embodied, tired, and the rest, and how can this be squared
with his being divine?"^ Sturch draws attention to two forms
that reduplicative propositions can take in order to explain
how Jesus could be both divine and tired. Unfortunately, as
we shall see, this explanation falls back on the epistemic
distinction he makes in connection with his objection to
Martin, and he repeats the earlier mistake of equivocating
between epistemic possibility and strict logical
possibility. The two forms he uses are these:
6. Peter Geach, Providence and Evil . (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1977), pp. 24-28.
7. Sturch, "God, Christ, and Possibilities", p. 83.
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(3) X, as P, is Q.
(4) X is, as P, Q.
Sturch suggests that these two differ in at least the
following way: in the first form, when we know that X is P
then we know that X is (or has) Q. This is apparently not
true for the second form. Sturch suggests, then, that these
forms can be interpreted as follows:
(5) X is Q because it is P.
(6) X is Q in its capacity as P.
Sturch claims that both these interpretative forms can
be used properly to understand reduplicative propositions.
Geach has proposed two sentences:
(7) Jones as Mayor can attend this committee meeting.
(8) Jones can as Mayor attend this committee meeting.
These sentences, Geach claims, are different, because
in the case where Jones is not yet the mayor but has the
opportunity of becoming Mayor the second sentence is true
while the first is not (this can be seen most clearly if we
read "has the opportunity of attending" for "can") . Geach
uses this sentence as an example of the Aristotelian point
that the second way is, in fact, the correct way of
analyzing reduplicative propositions; that is, the "as"
phrase must be understood as complicating the predicate,
rather than the subject term.
Sturch proposes that either way of analyzing the
sentences may be correct. He defends this claim by proposing
two more sentences:
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(9) Jones as Mayor is debarred from voting at CouncilMeetings except in the case of a tie.
(10) Jones is, as Mayor, debarred from voting atCouncil meetings except in the case of a tie.
Sturch claims that his example can be accurately stated
only in the first of these two sentences. He offers this as
a way of showing that Geach is wrong that only the second
way of analyzing these reduplicative propositions is
correct. But here Sturch seems to be mistaken. He claims
that, since anyone who holds the office of mayor is debarred
from voting (except in case of a tie)
,
then it is of no use
for Jones to vote any other way (for example, as Director of
the Gnome Works)
. This is because, Sturch argues, "The
impossibility of voting applies to anyone who holds the
office of Mayor. "8 Here is the problem with Sturch 's
example. He is assuming that Jones is always Mayor. But of
course he is not. Take the case where Jones is a Council
member, but he is not Mayor. Then (9) is false (because
Jones is not the Mayor) but (10) is true. Or take the case
where Jones is not only not the Mayor but he is also not a
Council member. Then (9) is false but (10) is not. Even
Sturch 's example, where Jones is the mayor, is not better
conveyed by (9) than (10) . We can see this clearly if we
apply the forms from (5) and (6)
.
Sturch wants to focus on
the case where Jones is mayor. There, he claims, (9) is the
correct reading. This is parallel to (5)
.
But Jones-as-Mayor
is not debarred from voting. Jones, in his capacity as
8. Sturch, "God, Christ, and Possibilities", p. 83.
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Mayor, is so debarred. This is parallel to (6). The "as"
phrase complicates the predicate, not the subject.
Sturch claims his analysis of the Jones case is similar
to the situation with Christ:
Similarly, if Christ is, as God, debarred from feelingtired, then surely he is also debarred from being tired
simpliciter
,
even though he is not debarred from it as
say, a carpenter. ^ '
What Sturch has done here is assume the truth of
Christ's being God. Suppose, for a moment, that it is not
true that Christ is God. Then the sentence "Christ is, as
God, debarred from feeling tired' is still true. But the
sentence "Christ as God is debarred from feeling tired" is
not (for the same reason that "Jones as Mayor can attend
this committee meeting" is not true when Jones is not
Mayor)
.
But even if it is true that Christ is God (or at least
has a divine nature)
,
it is not obviously true that if
Christ is, as God, debarred from feeling tired then he is
also debarred from feeling tired simpliciter . as Sturch
claims. Geach points out that the correct Aristotelian
analysis of "A is, as P, Q" is 'A', subject, 'is, as P, Q',
predicate. This predicate ('is, as P, Q') is a complex
predicate term that
entails the simple conjunctive predicate 'is both P and
Q' but not conversely.^®
9. Sturch, "God, Christ, and Possibilities", p. 83.
10. Geach, Providence and Evil, pp. 26-27.
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So the predicate "as God, is debarred from feeling
tired" entails "is both God and debarred from feeling
tired". But Sturch is not going to abandon his "epistemic
possibility" position easily.
The questions is, for the theologian, to which form
assertions like 'God cannot be a body' or 'God cannotbe tired' should be assigned. (I am assuming that these
are to be understood as compressed forms either of 'God
cannot be tired-as-God
• or 'God, as God, cannot ever betired
.) Knowledge again is our clue: we do perhapsknow enough about divinity to know that it excludes
tiredness from its own sphere, that no-one who is God
can be tired in the work proper to him as God. But thisdoes not automatically entail (though it might of
course be true, and indeed an Arian, say might try to
show that it was) that we know enough about divinity tobe sure that it excludes tiredness from anyone who
shares in it, that no one who is God can ever be tired
in any capacity. Assertions like 'God cannot be tired'
do therefore require analysis (failing more complete
information) into the [second] form.^^
Perhaps it is worth commenting here on the central
issue of using reduplicative propositions to explain the
Incarnation. It is helpful, of course, to suggest why God,
as human, can be tired, sad, or whatever. God, even with a
divine nature that has certain necessary characteristics or
qualities, can voluntarily take on properties that are
contingent (God can take on the property of being tired, or
of suffering bodily pain, etc.). Thus it can be perfectly
true to say that "God is, as incarnated, tired, sad, able to
feel pain, or whatever". That is because God's divine nature
does not debar God from taking on properties that are
normally thought, in themselves, to be contingent. It could
be, for example, that God has the property of being
11. Sturch, "God, Christ, and Possibilities", p. 84.
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incarnated, in a certain fashion, necessarily. While
incarnated, necessarily, God feels tired, which seems like a
contingent property. I do not think that much turns on this,
except the point that there is nothing untoward about God,
when incarnated, feeling tired. In fact, this is Geach's
point. But, if God can, as human, be tired, why is it not
true that God, as human, can possibly sin?
Sturch tries to solve this, above, by using
reduplicative propositions in the way I have outlined. But
the problem of Christ is that he has two natures, one human
and one divine. It seems to be a standard understanding of
"nature" to say that some being that has a certain nature
has the properties of that nature necessarily. Thus the
properties that one has in virtue of one's nature will not
be contingent properties. "Having a vote in Council
decisions", and "being the mayor" are both contingent
properties. But the sinlessness of Christ will not be
contingent. This is because sinlessness is a property that
Christ has, necessarily in virtue of having a divine nature.
That is, necessarily, if some being has a divine nature then
it is sinless. Traditionally, the sinlessness of God is
claimed to be necessary, since a being who is necessarily
sinless is greater, it is thought, than one who is sinless
contingently. So the claim is actually that necessarily, a
being who is God is necessarily sinless (morally good)
.
Christ, assuming that he has a divine nature, is then
necessarily sinless.
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So to try to explain the problem of the apparently
contradictory nature of Christ's natures using reduplicative
propositions presents a problem. The problem is that
Sturch's examples [(7)-(l0), above], are all reduplicative
propositions that state claims about properties that Jones
or the mayor have contingently. But the sentences below are
about properties that Christ has in virtue of his nature
(better, actually, to say in virtue of his natures)
. But
P^opci^tics that one has in virtue of one's nature are
necessary, at least in the sense of "necessarily, if one has
such-and-such a nature, then one has thus-and-so property".
It is not at all clear that Sturch's analogy from
reduplicative propositions that state claims about
contingent properties, such as the ability to vote, holds
for reduplicative propositions that state claims about
properties that one has in virtue of one's nature. The
following sentences are reduplicative propositions of the
second type:
(11) Christ, as God, could not possibly commit a sin.
(12) Christ, as human, could possibly commit a sin.
(13) Christ could not, as God, possibly commit a sin.
(14) Christ could, as human, possibly commit a sin.
It is worth noting here the similarity between (13) and
(10) above. Sturch's claim about (10) was that it was false
because it was pointless for Jones to try to cast a vote in
any other way: his being mayor prevented him from voting.
But this was an inadequate view, because the proper
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(Geachian) predicate was "could-not-vote-as-mayor"
. it was
something about being mayor that prevented him from voting,
but it was not (at all) a necessary fact that Jones was
mayor. He might not, of course, have been mayor, in which
case he might or might not have been able to vote at that
Council meeting (obviously he would have to be a Council
member to vote, for example)
. Nor is it necessary that the
mayor is prohibited from voting: that is simply a contingent
property that the mayor of Gnomeville happens to have. It
might easily be the case that the mayor could vote. It is
difficult to apply this reasoning to the case of the
pj^op^^tics that Christ has in virtue of his natures, because
of course they are a matter of necessity. Whatever it means
for Christ to have a human nature, he has those qualities
essentially. The same is true of his divine nature. So,
although the sentence "Christ could not, as God, commit a
sin" looks very much like the sentence "Jones, could not, as
mayor, vote in Council meetings except in case of a tie",
the two are different in the following sense. The "God-ness"
of Christ is essential to him, while the "mayor-ness" of
Jones is not essential to him. And the properties of God's
nature are essential, while properties such as the mayor's
lack of ability to vote in council meetings are not.
Sturch's mistake here lies in equating the inability of the
mayor of Gnomeville to vote in council meetings (except in
case of a tie) with the inability of God to commit a sin.
There is nothing necessary or essential about the inability
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of the person who is mayor of Gnomeville to vote at those
meetings; it is easy to imagine a different case. But the
inability of God to sin is traditionally thought to be an
essential property of divine nature: any being with divine
nature therefore has that property.
Of course the sentence "God could, as an incarnate
human, be tired)" looks like (14) above. And it is about
God, so it is tempting to imagine that it deals with
contradictory properties, or that it is based on the
assumption of contingent properties for God. But there is
nothing in orthodox Christianity which requires that the
Incarnation was a contingent property of God or of divine
nature. It seems plausible to claim that God has the
property of being incarnated, at a certain time and place,
necessarily. It also seems plausible to claim, that,
necessarily, if God is fully incarnated in Christ, Christ
would have many of the properties normally associated with
humanity without contradicting his divine nature. The free
ability to perform sin, however, especially for one whose
innocence is required for his ability to atone for the rest
of us, would not be one of those properties.
Sturch's final attempt to explain this problem away
falls back on his earlier distinction between propositions
or states of affairs that are possible relative to the
speaker's knowledge, and propositions or states of affairs
that are strictly logically possible:
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do evil', with which weegan. We had earlier, in effect, been treating this asan instance of the [first] form: Christ, being God
himin
.although the information tLt h4 wasu a left it possible that he could.
The appropriate reading of this form looks like this:
"Christ, because he is God, could not do evil, although the
information that he was human left it possible that he
could." But this claim about possibility is the one rejected
in the first half of this chapter. The information that
Christ was human left it possible that Christ could sin only
if the speaker (or hearer) did not also know that Christ was
God. Thus a limited, epistemic possibility that Christ could
sin exists, essentially when the speaker does not know any
better. The claim that for I all know, Christ could sin, is
then relevantly like the claim that for all I know, the
planet Pluto has seven moons. But it is incorrect to infer
that this epistemic possibility establishes the logical
possibility that Christ could sin. It is true that the claim
that the planet Pluto has seven moons is logically possible.
But it is not logically possible because it is epistemically
possible. The claim that for all I know, Christ could
possibly sin is more like the claim that for all I know, a
heptagon has six sides. The information that Christ was
human leaves it epistemically possible that he could sin,
but that does not imply that it is logically possible that
Christ could sin. Sturch is less clear here about the need
to read the parts of this claim with differing senses of
12. Sturch, "God, Christ, and Possibilities", p. 84.
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possible. Thus we are misled, at best, into thinking that he
may be suggesting that the epistemic possibility of Christ's
sinning entails the logical possibility that Christ could
sin. For the believer, who looks to Jesus as a moral
exemplar and a role model in the face of temptation, the
epistemic possibility that Christ could sin is not much
help. This is because someone who was tempted to sin, but
for whom it was impossible that he commit any sin, does not
really seem to be tempted in the same way as someone who is
tempted to sin and who can sin. And of course the problem
remains that Christian doctrine does not claim that "for all
we know" it is possible that Jesus committed a sin. The
claim seems to be that it was logically possible for Jesus
to commit a sin: "He was tempted in every way as we are."
According to our amended version of Martin, the doctrine of
the Incarnation seems to contain a contradiction. Sturch's
efforts to explain this contradiction away, although helpful
in clarifying Martin, do not seem finally to succeed. In
Chapter 5 I will discuss an interesting defense of the claim
that it was possible for Jesus to be tempted, based on his
own knowledge.
There is one other interesting line of argument,
apparently open to Sturch, which seems to make the point he
wants to make in a stronger fashion. The argument for this
goes something like this. It is necessary that whoever is
13. I am indebted to Gary Matthews for suggesting this
point.
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Christ IS sinless; that is, necessarily, if some person S is
Christ, then that person is sinless. Suppose, then, that
Jesus is Christ. We can even suppose, for the sake of
argument, that Jesus is necessarily Christ. But it does not
follow from either supposition, in conjunction with the
assertion above, that Jesus is necessarily sinless.
Therefore it is not necessary that Jesus is sinless. Jesus,
then, could possibly commit a sin. In that case, he could be
tempted to commit a sin in the same way that we are.
Therefore he could be tempted in every way that we are.
This is a challenging move, and it is intriguing. It
seems, based on this argument, that Jesus could be tempted
not to be God (or Christ)
. In that case, he could be enticed
or allured not to be Christ. That sounds like a real
temptation, in the same way that you or I can be tempted.
But careful examination reveals that this conclusion is
based on a controversial - and arguably incorrect - version
of the claim about the sinlessness of Christ.
It is true that it is necessary that Christ is sinless,
while it need not be true that it is necessary that Jesus is
the Christ. But the central claim of Christianity's doctrine
of the Incarnation is not that Jesus is necessarily sinless,
but that Christ is necessarily sinless. It may be true that
it is not necessary that Jesus is sinless, but that is
because Jesus might not be the Christ (Jesus seems to have
that property contingently) . But what is necessary is the
sinlessness of Christ; that is, whoever is the Christ is
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necessarily sinless. Thus the proper version of the claim
above is that necessarily, if some person S is Christ then
that person is necessarily sinless. The same result is
obtained if we simply claim that if some person, S, is
Christ, then that person is necessarily sinless. The defense
of this version goes something like this: whoever is Christ
has, besides a full and complete human nature, a likewise
full divine nature. One central aspect of divine nature is
moral perfection. For "moral perfection" to be an attribute
of some being's nature, it must be essential or necessary
(it could not be otherwise, or it is impossible for that
being to be that being without that attribute)
. Thus whoever
is Christ will be essentially, or necessarily, sinless. If
Jesus is not the Christ, then he is not necessarily sinless,
but then he is not Christ either, so he need not be sinless.
If he is not the Christ, then he is not the role model or
exemplar with respect to temptation that Christianity holds
in such esteem. But if he is the Christ, then he is
necessarily sinless, following this version of the tradition
about Christ's nature. Thus this last argument is, at best.
controversial
.
CHAPTER 5
ON MORRIS'S SOLUTION
As we have seen in the previous four chapters, the
simple claim that Jesus was tempted "in every way
as we are, yet without sin,"l gives rise to a complicated
problem. The Temptation Problem does not admit of a simple
solution. Thomas V. Morris, a modern philosopher writing
several decades after Sturch, has proposed an intriguing
solution to it. This chapter analyzes Morris's proposal.
In his book. The Logic of God Incarnate
. Morris argues
that the solution to the Temptation Problem lies in a
relatively simple philosophical distinction. ^ He claims
that, while it was metaphysically impossible for Jesus to
sin, it was nonetheless epistemically possible for Jesus,
while he exemplified his human nature, to sin. This
epistemic possibility of sinning, Morris claims, is
sufficient for the possibility of Jesus' temptation. Morris'
position on the Temptation Problem, then, is that it is not
a contradiction or even a problem to claim that it was
impossible for Jesus to sin and also possible for him to sin
as long as we understand that it was possible epistemically
for Jesus to sin.
1 . Hebrews 4:15. All Biblical quotations are from the
Revised Standard Version.
2. Thomas V. Morris, The Logic of God Incarnate (Ithaca and
London: Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 146-153.
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Of course Morris has some work to do in order to
establish that the possibility of Jesus performing a sinful
action need not be a metaphysical possibility in order to
maintain that Jesus could, in fact, be tempted. This seems
particularly important in order to preserve the traditional
two-natures-in-one-person view of the Incarnation. Morris
makes the following description of his claim:
Jesus could be tempted to sin just in case it was
epistemically possible for him that he sin. If at all
the times of his reported temptations, the full
accessible belief-set of his earthly mind did not rule
out the possibility of his sinning, he could be
genuinely tempted, in that range of consciousness, to
sin. But this could be so only if that belief-set did
not contain the information that he is necessarily
good. In order that he suffer real temptation, then, it
is not necessary that sinning be a broadly logical or
metaphysical possibility for Jesus; it is only
necessary that it be an epistemic possibility for him.^
Morris's argument may be formalized as follows;
(1) If it was epistemically possible for Jesus to sin,
then Jesus could suffer real temptation.
(2) It was epistemically possible for Jesus to sin.
(3) Therefore Jesus could suffer real temptation.
Morris's defense of premise (2) is fairly
straightforward. Premise (2) amounts to the claim that, for
all he knew, Jesus could sin. This would be true if "at the
times of his reported temptations, the full accessible
belief-set of [Jesus'] earthly mind... did not contain the
information that he is necessarily good".^ Morris defines a
full accessible belief-set as follows:
A full accessible belief-set of a person at a time
consists in all only those beliefs which are accessible
3. Morris, The Logic of God Incarnate . p. 148.
4. Morris, The Logic of God Incarnate . p. 148.
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to a range of conscious thought and deliberation ofthat person at that time sufficient to support theinitiation of action.
5
Assuming that Jesus had no information or belief that would
"rule out the possibility of his sinning", then it seems
reasonable to claim that it was epistemically possible for
Jesus to sin.
Premise (1) is, perhaps, a bit less straightforward.
Here Morris claims that the possession of a certain belief-
set - actually, the exclusion from a "full accessible"
belief-set of a particular belief - is a sufficient
condition for the possibility of Jesus' temptation. The
belief that must be excluded from Jesus' belief-set in order
to provide the appropriate full belief-set is the belief (or
knowledge) that he is necessarily good. Morris's claim is
that so long as Jesus does not believe that he is unable to
perform a sin, then he can be tempted to perform that sin.
Morris presents two examples in defense of this claim.
One is an example of a young member of an academic
department who is tempted to lie to his department head.
Unbeknownst to the junior faculty member, however, the
department head has just died. Thus it is epistemically
possible for the young professor to lie to his department
head, while it is not metaphysically possible. According to
Morris, this young professor can, nonetheless, "be tempted
to go and lie to his department chairman."^ There was
nothing in the full accessible belief-set of the young
5. Morris, The Logic of God Incarnate . p. 148.
6. Morris, The Logic of God Incarnate , p. 147.
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professor that would cause him to believe it was not
possible for him to "go and lie to" his department head;
that is, for all he knew, the young professor could tell a
lie to his department head. Morris's claim about this
situation is that the young professor could be tempted to
lie because there was no reason for him to doubt that he
could.
This is a clever and interesting story. It is important
to note here that Morris's claim is not that the possession
of the appropriate full accessible belief-set is sufficient
temptation. His claim is, rather, that possession of the
appropriate full accessible belief-set is sufficient for the
possibility of temptation. He says that the young professor
gpuld be tempted as long as he believes that he is able to
tell his department head a lie. It is more accurate,
actually, to say that he could be tempted to tell her the
lie as long as nothing prevents him from believing that he
can tell her the lie. It seems reasonable, after all, to say
of the young professor that, since nothing he believes to be
true would suggest to him that he could not tell the
department head a lie, then it is possible that he is
tempted to tell her a lie.
The problem with Morris's claim is a somewhat subtle
one. His sufficient condition for the possibility of
temptation sounds plausible, but only because it overlaps a
more plausible one. It is not true that the young professor
can be tempted to lie to his department chair only because
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he does not know she is dead, in order for his temptation to
be possible, he must be also capable of forming - or at
least of considering, somehow - the intention to perform the
(sinful) act in question. He can be tempted to lie to his
department head in all the cases where he can form the
intention of lying to her and, of course, where nothing
prevents him from believing this to be possible. There must
be a possible world in which he actually intends to perform
the action that he is tempted to do in this world. There is
such a possible world in the case we are considering. It is
the world very much like this one where he actually forms
the intention to tell his department head a lie. It is true
that there is nothing that he can do to bring about a world
in which he actually lies to his department head. But it is
his ability to intend to lie to her (coupled with the
appropriate full accessible belief-set) that is sufficient
for the possibility of his temptation, not his ability
actually to lie to her. Surely it is not possible to be
attracted or enticed to do something if it is not possible
to intend to do it. Thus his belief that nothing prevents
him from lying to her is, in reality, not sufficient for the
possibility of his being tempted to lie to her. He must also
be able to intend or will to lie to her.
Suppose that the young professor, without knowing it,
has a small mechanism implanted in his brain that prohibits
him from performing any morally wrong action. Whenever he is
presented with a situation in which he might do something
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morally wrong, it prevents him from performing such an
action. Of course, since intending to do a morally wrong
thing is itself morally wrong, the mechanism prevents him
from so intending. The young professor believes his
department head is alive. When he is presented with a
situation where he might lie to her, the little mechanism
prevents him from intending to lie to her, as well as from
actually lying to her. He knows what a lie is, and he knows
what it would mean for him to tell a lie. But if he is
attracted by the opportunity to lie to her and the promise
of gain or reward for doing so, and even starts to consider
forming the intention to lie to her, the mechanism goes off.
To consider the reward he must imagine intending to perform
the action. But the situation where he forms such an
intention is not really accessible to him, because the
mechanism prevents him from intending to lie. Without being
able to consider the connection between the action and the
reward, it seems false to claim that the professor could be
tempted to lie to his department head, in the theologically
interesting understanding of "temptation" as enticement or
allure to do something unwise or immoral with the promise of
gain or reward.
Here is the important parallel in the case of Jesus.
Following Morris's view, we might say that Jesus could be
tempted to lie only if there is no belief in his full
accessible belief-set that rules out the possibility of his
telling that lie. But that is not sufficient for the
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possibility of Jesus' temptation. Just as with the young
professor, there must be some possible world in which Jesus
forms the intention to lie in order for establish the
possibility of his being tempted to lie. But, of course,
there is no such world. I am assuming here, of course, that
it is sinful to form the intention to sin. Jesus' necessary
goodness prevents the existence of any possible world where
Jesus sins. If there is no possible world where he sins,
there is no possible world where he intends to sin. There is
not even a possible world where it is possible that he
intends to sin. Given that state of affairs, then it is not
possible that Jesus was tempted to sin.
Following Morris's view, it seems that we might say
that Jesus could be tempted to lie to Mary Magdalene,
because it was epistemically possible that he lie to her.
For all he knew, Jesus could tell her a lie. And this is
true even if, in fact, it was metaphysically impossible for
Jesus to do so. Given that Jesus was necessarily morally
good (and assuming that telling a lie to Mary Magdalene was
a morally wrong thing to do)
,
there was no possible world in
which Jesus could perform the action of telling a lie to
Mary Magdalene (or to anyone else, for that matter) . But the
issue is whether there was any possible world in which Jesus
intended to lie to Mary Magdalene.
That is the rub. For the possibility to exist that
Jesus could be tempted, he must have been able to consider
or imagine a world in which he intended to commit whatever
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sin would tempt him. We are using the example of a lie. He
must have been able to imagine or consider a world, then,
where he forms the intention to lie. But of course there was
no such world. Without such a world, Jesus could not have
been tempted.
Morris might argue, of course, that nothing of the
above denies his claim. Jesus was morally perfect, so he
never considered lying; that is, he never imagined a world
in which he lied. It would still be true, in that case, that
for Jesus it was epistemically possible that he tell a lie.
For all he knew, he could lie. To point out that he never
considered actually lying does not change the truth of that
claim. Thus the epistemic possibility described above is all
that is needed for the possibility of temptation.
But such a defense strays pretty far from a reasonable
understanding of "temptation". It also seems to establish
firmly the notion that Jesus is not really a moral model
relevant to human temptations and concerns. Perhaps Jesus
never faced a situation in which he imagined himself lying,
or one where he said something like this to himself, "I
could tell an untruth here." But this seems to be poor
evidence, at best, that he could be tempted to lie. If he
never considered telling a lie, or having lust in his heart,
or stealing, or harboring anger against someone, then it
seems empty to claim that Jesus was tempted as we are.
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Of course there is one clear Biblical story of an
occasion when Jesus was tempted. In Luke 4 the story is told
this way:
And Jesus, full of the Holy Spirit, returned from the
Jordan, and was led by the Spirit for forty days in the
wilderness, tempted by the devil. And he ate nothing in
those days; and when they were ended, he was hungry.
The devil said to him, "If you the Son of God, command
to become bread." And Jesus answered him,
'*^t is written, 'Man shall not live by bread alone. '"
And the devil took him up, and showed him all the
kingdoms of the world in a moment of time, and said to
him, "To you I will give all this authority and their
glory; for it has been delivered to me, and I give it
to whom I will. If you, then, will worship me, it shall
all be yours." And Jesus answered him, "It is written,
'You shall worship the Lord your God, and him only
shall you serve.
We are not considering here the sense of temptation in
which Jesus is simply presented with a potentially tempting
situation, the way we might say that I am tempted when my
daughter shows me a box of chocolate covered ants (that is,
she is presenting me with a temptation) . Her presentation of
the ants is a sort of "external" temptation, but we want to
discuss here what might be called "internal" temptation,
when one feels attracted to or allured by the temptation
presented [see Chapter 1]. So we must consider whether Jesus
can be tempted in this specific way that we are. If the
devil took me up to the tower and presented me with a vista
of all the kingdoms on earth that I could rule if only I
would bow to him once, out there in the wilderness, I
certainly would consider performing such an action ( we will
assume that actually to perform that action would be morally
7. Luke 4:1-8.
112
• I tempted by that action because there is a
possible world where I actually perform it (or at least
intend to perform it) which is alluring or enticing to me,
and nothing in my full accessible belief-set prevents me
from believing that the whole scenario is possible. For
Jesus to be tempted "in every way as we are", it seems that
the same must be true of him.
But it is not, at least if Jesus is necessarily good.
Although it may be true that nothing in Jesus' full
accessible belief-set prevents him from believing that he
could worship the devil, he cannot intend to do it. To do so
there would have to be a possible world where he, in fact,
forms the intention of worshipping the devil. But there is
no such world. Even if there were such a world, Jesus would
also have to find it enticing. Presumably one finds
something enticing when the thought of it is somehow
enjoyable or pleasurable. But surely to enjoy or take
pleasure in a sinful thought is itself sinful, and that is
precisely what Jesus' nature precludes. It is not possible
for Jesus to sin, so there is no possible world where he
commits a sin. Certainly forming the intention of
worshipping the devil is a sin. So also, if I am right, is
enjoying the thought of ruling the world because one has
bowed down to the Devil (a somewhat different thought from
the idea of ruling the world, period) . Thus there can be no
possible world where Jesus forms the intention of
worshipping the Devil, nor can there be one where he enjoys
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or takes pleasure in the thought of such a state of affairs.
This is true, of course, even if Jesus believes, somehow,
that nothing prevents him from doing this. Thus it is not
possible for Jesus to be tempted, by the Devil, in this very
important way that you or I can be tempted.
Someone might raise the objection that Jesus might
believe that it is possible for him to intend to sin. What I
have just argued is intended as an answer to that objection,
by noting that such a belief would be necessary, but not
sufficient, for the possibility of his temptation. There
seems to be a reply open to Morris, at this point, to refute
my point. He might say, for example, that Jesus was fully
human, just as human, say, as Johnny Nimblef inger . Now
suppose that Johnny walks into the Philosophy office one day
and sees a twenty dollar bill sitting on the secretary's
desk. Johnny would quickly consider whether to take it or
not. He might think to himself something like, "Should I
take it, or not?" He would look around, ascertain that no
one was present, and then slip the bill into his pocket. Now
imagine Jesus in the same situation. Of course he would see
the bill and consider whether to take it. Jesus would also
think something like, "Should I take it, or not?" Of course
he would not take it, but as long as nothing prevents him
from believing that he can take it, he could (and would)
consider taking it. He would be tempted, perhaps, but not
succumb. He need not form the intention to take it, but it
is nonetheless possible for him to think about forming such
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an intention. He would simply reject it as wrong, Morris
might claim, and he would leave the bill there.
In answer to this problem, it seems that we have to
take seriously just what it means for something to be
metaphysically impossible. Take the example of a "clear blue
frog". It seems that, following any standard view of
impossibility, there is no possible world where such a
creature exists (assuming that what we mean by "clear" and
"blue" and "frog" will hold constant between this world and
any such possible world)
. It does not make sense to speak of
such a world because there is none. The same is true of the
claim that Jesus is necessarily morally good. If we take the
claim seriously, then there can be no possible world where
Jesus sins or intends to sin. It does not seem that there
can even be a world where Jesus is attracted to or enticed
by twenty stolen dollars, because that it certainly not the
state of mind of a necessarily morally good person. Such a
person will not enjoy the thought of owning any stolen
property. It is not possible for him to be attracted to or
enticed by taking the twenty dollar bill any more than it is
possible to see a "clear blue frog". Thus Jesus is not the
same as Johnny Nimblef inger
,
at least in the sense of his
ability to be attracted or enticed by morally wrong actions.
This latter account of what happened at the most famous
of Jesus' temptations seems almost silly. Of course he could
form the intention of worshipping the devil. One small,
simple bow, out where no one could see it; certainly there
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is a possible world where that happens - or at least one
where Jesus forms the intention of performing that action.
And certainly Jesus could imagine it. That is how he was
tempted, just as you or I would be. But Jesus chooses not to
accept the temptation. There is a possible world in which he
succumbs to it. Jesus simply rejects that world and that
course of action; he overcomes the temptation. We might even
say that is the point of the story.
Of course Morris is not going to give up so easily. He
presents one other interesting example of his claim that "it
is the epistemic possibility of sinning rather than the
broadly logical, or metaphysical, or even physical
possibility of sinning that is conceptually linked to
temptation".® He might suggest this story as a defense
against my criticism of his position.
Suppose ... that a certain form of time-travel is
impossible, but that Brown, a great scientist with
eccentric ways who loves a practical joke, approaches
Jones with an elaborate-looking apparatus about the
size of a telephone booth which she tells Jones can
effect that form of time travel, an invention of hers
as yet unknown to the world-at-large or even to the
scientific community. Jones, believing Brown, can be
tempted to travel in the machine in order to commit
some evil deed otherwise impossible. The reality of his
temptation does not require the broadly logical, or
metaphysical possibility of what he is doing. It
requires only that the imagined deed not be an
epistemic impossibility for him. He must think it
possible, and within his power to do. It need not be
actually so.^
This example seems more like the case of Jesus than does the
young professor story. It is metaphysically impossible for
8. Morris, The Logic of God Incarnate , p. 147.
9. Morris, The Logic of God Incarnate . p.l47.
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Jesus to sin even if, following Morris's view, there is no
member of Jesus' full accessible belief—set that prevents
him from believing that he can sin. It is metaphysically
impossible that Jones travel in the way described, even
though he believes it to be possible (none of his beliefs
prevents him from believing it possible) . But as long as he
believes it to be true that he can travel in that way, then
it seems reasonable to infer that he can be tempted by the
impossible sin. So also with Jesus. As long as Jesus does
not believe it to be impossible for him to sin, then he can
be tempted.
But this is not the case. But this is not the case.
Jones, in the case described here, is fully capable of doing
something that Jesus cannot, and it is that ability which
makes it possible for Jones to be tempted where Jesus cannot
be. Jones can be attracted - lured by the arousal of hope or
desire - by the sin in question. It is not possible (other
than epistemically) that he actually commits the evil deed.
But he is able to be tempted by it not only because there is
no belief in his full accessible belief-set that prevents
him from believing he can do it, but also because there is a
possible world in which he enjoys or takes pleasure in the
thought of doing it. That possible world is what enables
Jones to be attracted to or enticed by the evil deed, thus
also enabling him to be tempted. The time-travel scenario is
tempting to Jones not only because he believes it is
possible but also because it is, in fact, possible for Jones
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to be attracted to the sin in question. Thus it is not true
that simply believing that there is nothing to prevent one
from committing an act is sufficient to say truly that it is
possible that one can be tempted by the act. It must also be
possible for one to be attracted to or enticed by the act.
Then, and only then, can one be tempted to perform that
action.
It is precisely this ability to be enticed to commit
any sin that Jesus lacks because of his divine nature, at
least as that nature is traditionally understood. If Jesus
is necessarily good, then there is no possible world where
Jesus sins. In that case there is no possible world where
Jesus is attracted or enticed to commit any sin. Jones is
tempted by the time travel because he is able to be so
enticed and, thus, to form the intention to commit the sin
that the impossibility of time travel prohibits him from
performing. Jesus cannot be tempted to commit any sins
because it is not possible for him to be attracted by or
enticed to sin. There are no possible worlds where Jesus
forms the intention to do a morally wrong thing, and there
are no worlds where he enjoys the thought of committing a
sin enough to be enticed by the sin, because to do either
would be to do a morally wrong thing. That, of course, is
contrary to his divine nature.
Morris's error here seems to be that he has not
provided appropriate sufficient grounds for a situation of
temptation to exist. He wants to preserve Jesus divinity, of
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course, so his attempt to show that it was somehow possible
that Jesus could sin without it actually being possible that
Jesus commit a sin is understandable. But I think I have
shown that he fails in that attempt, despite the intriguing
approach he takes. I have suggested, briefly, that a
conjunction of the appropriate full accessible belief-set,
the metaphysical possibility of intending to commit a sin,
and the ability to be attracted by or enticed to the
commission of some sin seems sufficient for the possibility
of temptation. But that suggestion is only a brief sketch,
and even that sketch poses problems for the claim that Jesus
is necessarily morally good. In any case, it seems that
Morris fails to solve the Temptation Problem, because he
cannot establish that the epistemic possibility that Jesus
(or anyone else) commits some sin is a sufficient condition
for the claim that it is possible that Jesus (or anyone
else) can be tempted to commit that sin.
Morris has one other interesting avenue of defense that
he uses to claim that it need not be true that Jesus
possibly sinned. He makes a distinction between the
properties required for one to be merely human and those
required to be fully human. The distinction goes something
like this. Something that is fully x has all the properties
essential to its being x. Something that is merely x has all
the properties essential to being x and no other properties
that will also make it something other (or, perhaps more
accurately, something "higher") than x metaphysically.
Morris uses this example:
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Consider a diamond. It has all the properties essential
to being a physical object (mass, spatio-temporal
location, etc.)
.
So it is fully physical. Consider now
an alligator. It has all the properties essential to
being a physical object. It is fully physical. But,
there is a sense in which we can say that it is not
merely physical. It has properties of animation as
well. It is an organic being. In contrast, the gem is
merely physical as well as being fully physical.
A similar relation is true, of course, for humans. We
are fully physical but not merely physical (as is a
diamond). Morris's claim for Jesus is that he was (and is)
fully human but not merely human. He possessed all of the
characteristics of humanity, but he also possessed the
properties of divinity. In particular, Morris points out
that some properties we might normally think of as essential
to humanity are really just common to humans, but not
essential to being fully human. He suggests, for example,
the properties of "coming to be at some time, being a
contingent creation, and being such as to possibly cease to
exist" . H He suggests, further, that some simple thought-
experiments will lend plausibility to this notion. One
enjoyable example is the notion that all humans have the
same origin: two biological parents (of course Adam seems to
be an obvious counterexample to this, but it is a useful
example nonetheless) . Morris invites us to imagine a future
time when scientists in a fancy lab can create, from
10. Morris, The Logic of God Incarnate , pp. 65-66.
11. Morris, The Logic of God Incarnate , p. 67.
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scratch, the makings of what we now call a fertilized human
egg. Assuming that a person could then grow from such a
creation, that human would not have as its origin two
biological parents. So it seems wrong to claim that
originating from two biological parents is essential for
humanity. 12 is however, extremely common. But Morris's
point is that commonality and essentiality are not the same.
The relevant claim for which Morris uses this
distinction is this:
It can be held that being such that one possibly sins
is a property essential only to being merely human, to
belonging to the kind of humanity and to no higher
kind. On this view, Jesus need not be such that he
possibly sins, since he is not, on the traditional
view, merely human. .
.
[Thus] an orthodox theologian can
accommodate an essentiality intuition with respect to
the relation between this property and ordinary human
beings without counting it as a component of the kind-
essence of humanity. 12
This, at first blush, seems a somewhat stretched view.
Of course Morris has an interesting point. And he makes
clear, just after the passage above, just how difficult it
is to pinpoint what the property of possibly sinning
actually is. Do fetuses have the property of possibly
sinning? Souls in heaven? Or, as Morris would have it, is
possibly sinning just a property of someone who is merely
human, not necessarily someone who is fully, but not merely,
human?
This is somewhat reminiscent of the solution Aquinas
proposed [see Chapter 3]. He suggested that while the
12. Morris, The Logic of God Incarnate , p. 69.
13. Morris, The Logic of God Incarnate , pp. 142-143.
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descendants of Adam, of course, have the property of
possibly sinning due to their fertilizing principle, Jesus
does not have that property because he does not have an
®^^thly father . But Aguinas failed to allow for the fact
that Adam, who also did not result from an human fertilizing
principle, nonetheless had the capacity to sin (this is
established by the fact that he did sin) . To claim that
Jesus did not have this capacity seems to deny his full
humanity: Jesus then failed to have the capacity for free
choice that Adam had (and the rest of us have)
.
To deny Jesus' full humanity based on the lack of a
certain property suggests that the possibility of sinning -
properly formulated - is, in fact, an essential property of
human nature. Any fully human being must then have that
property. And, of course, if that is true of Jesus then it
cannot also be impossible that he commit a sin.
But this leaves us back at the beginning, with an
unsolved Temptation Problem. It seems that either Jesus is
not really a relevant model for us or that something has to
give. One possibility is that Jesus lacks the possibility of
sinning that the rest of us have so richly. But such a Jesus
is hardly "fully human." Another possibility is that we must
somehow refine our understanding of Jesus' moral goodness
and, consequently, our understanding of God's moral
goodness. My intuition is that the second avenue is the more
promising of the two. But that is a "long and winding road",
best left for a more lengthy, later treatment.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
As we have seen in the preceding chapters, both
versions of the defense of orthodox Christian doctrine about
Jesus' temptation seem to fail. Augustine simply rules out
the possibility that Jesus - the Christ - could be tempted
by any temptation that may have sin or sinfulness as part of
the temptation itself. Such a temptation would be logically
impossible, but of course it is also true, then, that Christ
was not tempted in all the ways that we are. Caesarius
suggests, somewhat provocatively, that something about
Jesus' holy will must have kept him from succumbing to
temptation (of any important sort)
,
but Caesarius simply
asserts that claim without any evidence or defense.
Anselm tries to show that it is both possible and
impossible that Jesus sins, but that flounders on his poor
example and argument for the possibility that Jesus sins.
Aquinas tries an intriguing approach, in which it is claimed
that Jesus has the original justice that the rest of us lost
in Adam and Eve's Fall, so that he is able to resist all
temptations. On this view, however, Christ seems to lack the
ability to sin that the rest of us, again, have in full
measure.
Sturch proposes an interesting solution to the
Temptation Problem by pointing out that it is not
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contradictory to claim that it is both possible and
impossible for Jesus to sin, provided that we understand
that two different definitions of "possible" are intended.
The claim that it is possible for Christ to sin is a claim
about epistemic possibility on Sturch's view, while the
claim that it is impossible for him to sin is a claim about
logical possibility. While this is attractive, Sturch makes
his claim in such an unclear way that he is subject to the
charge of being misleading. He also fails adequately to
address the problem of the apparent contradiction in the
claim that it is both logically possible and logically
impossible for Christ to sin.
Morris proposes what is in many ways the most
intriguing solution, based on the claim that one need only
to believe that nothing prevents one from performing some
sinful act in order to be tempted by it. Morris fails to
account for the need to be attracted to or enticed by
something sinful in order to be tempted by it, and I have
claimed that Christ cannot be enticed by, or take pleasure
from the thought of, something sinful.
I have shown, then, that none of these attempts to
solve the Temptation Problem succeeds, despite the
interesting variety of approaches. In fact, I believe that
it is an insoluble problem, provided that one feels
compelled to hold both that God is necessarily morally
perfect and that one needs to be enticed by potential
pleasure or reward from something immoral or unwise in order
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to be tempted. Certainly for Christ to be tempted in every
way that we are, he must be tempted in this serious way, as
well as in the minor ways outlined in Chapter 1.
It is worth noting here, in conclusion, that a number
of contemporary philosophers have suggested that God may
not, in fact, be necessarily morally perfect. 1 Two authors,
Bruce Reichenbach and Nelson Pike, have also challenged the
claim that a God whose nature prevents God from committing
any sin is nonetheless morally praiseworthy (worthy, that
is, of moral praise or approbation) . 2 Given the extreme
difficulty of "solving" the Temptation Problem, this is a
probable and promising route. To travel along this route,
however, will of course entail abandoning almost two
thousand years of Christian orthodoxy. My project has simply
been to make the case stronger for the need to explore
routes like this one, which are alternatives to the
traditional orthodoxy. I have tried to show that the
Temptation Problem is a difficult or even impossible
position that nonetheless requires defending within
traditional, orthodox Christian doctrine. To the extent that
I have shown this I hope to encourage a reconsideration of
1. See (for example) Wesley Morriston, "Is God Significantly
Free?", Faith and Philosophy , vol. 2, no. 3 (July 1986), pp.
257-264; Robert F. Brown, "God's Ability to Will Moral
Evil", Faith and Philosophy , vol. 8, no. 1 (January 1991),
pp. 3-20.
2. Nelson Pike, "Omnipotence and God's Ability to Sin",
American Philosophical Quarterly 6 (1969), pp. 208-215;
Bruce R. Reichenbach, "Why is God Good?", Journal ^
Religion 60 (1980), pp. 51-60.
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the nature of God's moral goodness and its relationship to
the moral world of Christian believers.
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